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Abstract 
This thesis focuses on the response of the Australian government to the outbreak of the 
Indonesian Outer-Island rebellion and the American intervention-through the CIA- to support 
the rebels against the Central Government in Jakarta. The Australia-Indonesia bilateral 
relationship is considered one of Australia’s most crucial diplomatic relationships. This thesis 
will situate the Australian response to the rebellion within the historical context of Australia’s 
post-1945 engagement with Asia, the Cold War, and the process of decolonisation in 
Southeast Asia. Drawing on a variety of Australia and American primary sources, including 
diplomatic cables, government memoranda, private letters, press releases, reports, oral 
histories, and newspapers, the thesis will analysis how Australian politicians, diplomats and 
military officials dealt with a major foreign policy crisis in what Prime Minister Menzies 
called the “near north”. 
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Introduction and Historiography of the Outer Islands Rebellion 
1956-58 
 
In 1958, the Australian Government confronted the possibility that its largest neighbour-
Indonesia- would fragment politically. This thesis aims to understand the response of the 
Australian government to a crisis that had serious ramifications for Australian national 
security. When referring to the Australian government, this thesis will look at the response of 
senior Australian politicians; mainly within the governing Liberal-Country party coalition of 
Prime Minister Robert Menzies, military figures and civil servants; particularly from the 
Department of External Affairs and Defence.   Using a range of understudied primary sources 
from the United States and Australia, as well as secondary material, I hope to place the 
“Outer- Islands Rebellion” within the broader context of Australian regional engagement post 
World War II (WW2). 
 One cannot explore how Australia dealt with this emergency without looking at how the 
United States- the preeminent power in the Pacific and Australia’s most vital ally- responded 
to the crisis in Indonesia. The thesis will synthesise the attitudes and policies of Australian 
and American politicians, diplomats, and military figures to the events in Indonesia leading to 
the rebellion. The bulk of the thesis will focus on how a regional uprising evolved into a civil 
war. As the regional rebels in Sumatra and Suluwesi and the Central Government in Java 
fought for supremacy; the following four chapters will explore how Australian and American 
leaders dealt with these alarming developments in the context of the Cold War in Asia. 
Finally, it will deal with the aftermath of the short-lived civil war, in relation to both 
Australian and American policies towards Indonesia 
For many new nation-states that had been former European colonies, and gained their 
independence following WWII, the 1950s was a period of uncertainty. Questions arose over 
how these new nations should be organised as political entities, how to cope with the new 
economic conditions created by the end of colonial rule, how ethnic minorities were to be 
treated within the new state, and how these new nations would go about crafting a foreign 
policy which protected their newly gained sovereignty.
1
 In 1949, Indonesia gained 
                                                          
1
 George McTurnan Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1952). 
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independence through a negotiated settlement with the Dutch after four years of warfare. The 
decade following the euphoria of liberation was marked by questions over the nature of the 
newly created state. Was Indonesia to be a federal entity or a centralised republic, how were 
economic resources to be distributed throughout the new nation and what role were non-
Javanese political actors to have in government? Additionally, foreign policy was essential in 
defining Indonesia as an international actor. In the increasingly tense climate of the Cold 
War, was Indonesia going to maintain strict neutrality, or lean towards either the Soviet 
Union or United States?
2
  
 
These questions would eventually lead to the outbreak of a bloody civil war in 1958. The 
military conflict between the central government in Jakarta and the military rebels and their 
supports on the outer-islands of Sumatra and Suluwesi would kill and/or injure thousands. 
The violence unleashed would alter the political, social, and economic landscape of this 
sprawling archipelago. This conflict little known  outside of Indonesia has become known as 
either ‘the Outer-Islands Rebellion’, ‘Colonel’s Revolt or the Revolutionary Government of 
Indonesia Revolts (Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia, or PRRI). 
For Australian politicians, diplomats and military figures the events of the Outer-Island 
Rebellion were understood within the context of the Cold War and the end of formal 
European imperialism in the region. The political and military unrest that engulfed Indonesia 
during the mid to late 1950s was a product of both of the above elements. As the Cold War 
intensified in Asia; particularly following the emergence of Communist China, the Korean 
War, the French defeat in Indochina and the advent of various Communist inspired 
insurgencies, Australian political leaders feared that the “red tide” would engulf its nearest 
and most important neighbour: Indonesia. The growing political strength of the Indonesian 
Communist Party (PKI) and the growing role of the Soviet Union and Communist China in 
Indonesian affairs fuelled these fears.  The problem of decolonisation in terms of the 
Australian response to the Outer-Island Rebellion is exemplified by the fraught issue of 
Dutch control of the Western half of New Guinea. For Australia, the issue of West New 
                                                          
2
 Richard Mason, “Containment and the Challenge of Non-Alignment: The Cold War and U.S. Policy towards 
Indonesia, 1950-52,” in Connecting Histories: Decolonization and the Cold War in Southeast Asia, 1945-1962, 
edited by Christopher E. Goscha and Christian F. Ostermann (Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 
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Guinea (West Irian to the Indonesians) was not just a matter of its strategic value in terms of 
Australian national defence. The salience of the issue of West New Guinea related to how 
Australia wished to manage the potential instability of decolonisation in the region. As the 
domestic political situation deteriorated in Indonesia in the lead up to the rebellion, 
Australian officials feared that an unstable and potentially pro-Communist Indonesian 
government would not only threaten Australia if it gained control of West New Guinea, but 
undermine the process of decolonisation in Australia’s own colonies of Papua and New 
Guinea.  
 
Western historical scholarship on this period in Indonesian history has remained limited. The 
works that have focused on the era are general concerned with the American (CIA) 
intervention to support the rebels against Jakarta in 1958.   Audrey and George McT. Kahin 
published the most comprehensive work on the subject in 1995. In Subversion as Foreign 
Policy, George McT. Kahin, an Indonesia specialist, spent several years in Indonesia in the 
late 1940s as a private citizen and academic.
3
 He came to know leaders on both the 
government and rebel sides during the 1958 crisis who he interviewed extensively. Mr and 
Mrs Kahin made extensive use of primary sources from the United States (although CIA 
records still remained elusive), and the United Kingdom, combined with Mr and Mrs Kahin’s 
extensive Indonesian sources, to produce what is still arguably the most definitive work on 
the U.S intervention in Indonesia. As a scholar of American involvement in South-East Asia, 
McT. Kahin’s Subversion is firmly within the broader narrative of the United States long road 
to Vietnam. As an outspoken academic critic of the US involvement in Vietnam, Kahin sees 
the U.S intervention in Indonesia that he qualifies as “the most important American operation 
since WW II” as a failure to appreciate the nuances of Indonesian nationalism, a charge that 
he repeated in relation to Vietnam.
4
 In terms of the actual American involvement, Kahin 
keeps his focus squarely on the top decision-makers in both Jakarta and Washington D.C. 
Alternatively in Feet to the Fire: Covert Operations in Indonesia 1957-58, Kenneth Conboy 
and James Morrison delve into the organisational, planning and on the ground covert actions 
                                                          
3
 See Audrey R. Kahin and George McT. Kahin, Subversion as Foreign Policy: The secret Eisenhower and Dulles 
Debacle in Indonesia (New York: The New Press, 1995). 
4
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conducted by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).
5
 Conboy and Morrison, made extensive 
use of their knowledge of Indonesia, and had access to veterans of both government and 
rebels sides as well as former CIA operatives. Researched throughout much of the 1990s and 
published in the 2000, they were able to interview many of the actual participants who were 
young men and women at the time. In comparison to Subversion, Feet to the Fire provides a 
grassroots examination of the operation rather than one of policy. Feet to the Fire can be 
firmly placed within the growing scholarship on the Eisenhower Administration’s use of 
covert operations in foreign policy.
6
 Conboy and Morrison pay close attention to the 
organisation of the CIA operations within Indonesia, in particular the infamous rebel air force 
created to provide dissenting military officers with air cover over Sumatra and Suluwesi.  
Both of these works are beneficiaries of the 1994 release of the Foreign Relations of the 
United States Volume concerning Indonesia between 1958 and 1960.
7
 This volume is the 
most comprehensive in terms of State Department documents and private papers from key 
American policy-makers. However, as its editors have noted, it is still a transitional volume 
as key information regarding important intelligence operations on Sumatra and Sulawesi 
remain classified, even post-Church Committee.
8
  
 
Barbara S. Harvey’s 1984 work Permesta: Half a Rebellion, explores the domestic dynamics 
that lit the fires of rebellion throughout the archipelago.
9
 Harvey’s approach emphasises the 
economic and political difficulties the Indonesian Republic faced during the mid to late 
1950s.
 
In particular, Harvey addresses the growing economic difficulties the Republic faced; 
the stagnation of the Indonesian parliamentary system, unequal distribution of economic 
resources throughout the archipelago and the polarisation of political parties along regional 
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lines. According to Harvey, foreign policy, became a source of discord, as former political 
allies during the revolution split along Cold War lines.  In this respect, she has followed on 
from the esteemed Australian political scientist Herb Feith whose 1962 book The Decline of 
Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia remains the definitive account of Indonesia’s first 
decade in terms of party politics and economics.
10
  
 
Both Feith and Harvey argue that the source of growing unrest particularly on the Outer-
Islands is related to the rehabilitation of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). In 1948, the 
PKI attempted to seize the mantle of leadership of the Indonesian Revolution. This attempt 
involved pro-PKI forces seizing the city of Madiun in Java,
11
the result of which was the 
revolt being crushed by Republican troops. After its attempt at armed revolt was crushed the 
PKI evolved into a mass-based political organisation committed to the Sukarno’s principles 
of Pancasila (five principles). In the 1955 general elections-the first since the proclamation of 
independence- the PKI had substantial electoral success, particularly on Java. This provoked 
opposition, particularly from Masjumi and other Islamist and liberal parties with political 
support bases outside Java. The growing political deadlock following the success of the PKI 
led President Sukarno to become increasingly disillusioned by parliamentary democracy.
12
 
Sukarno hoped to harness the spirit of national unity through “guided democracy” (demokrasi 
terpimpin) to overcome the “disease of parties.” Instead, a national council made up of all 
elements within society (including the PKI) was to end the deadlock. This process of 
centralisation of power in Jakarta-particularly in the guise of Sukarno- met with increasing 
resistance on the Outer-Islands that would sow the seeds of revolt.  
 
The Outer-Islands Revolt of 1957-58 is a key event in the Cold War. The policies pursued by 
the Eisenhower Administration had serious ramifications for the future of Southeast Asia as 
noted by George McT Kahin. In the course four chapters, I will explain how Australia 
responded to these events.  If the American intervention is as significant event as stated, 
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 Herb Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia (Singapore: Equinox Publishing (Asia), 
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understanding Australia’s position is essential, if we are to fully understand the larger story of 
post-1945 Australian engagement with Asia.  
 
Drawing on an array of primary sources and tapping into the existing historiography of 
Australian foreign policy, the Cold War in Asia, and the foreign policy of the United States; 
this thesis seeks to comprehensively analysis the Australian response to growing political 
unrest in Indonesia. It will also explore how Australian politicians, diplomats, and military 
figures reacted to the Eisenhower Administration’s attempt to use the CIA to prevent 
Indonesia going Communist.  The thesis is structured chronologically-as history happens- to 
capture the evolution of the Outer-Island rebellion from isolated pockets of regional dissent to 
a full-scale civil war with regional ramifications.  
Chapter One focuses on how both the Australia and the United States dealt with the outbreak 
of the Indonesian Revolution against the Dutch and the emergence of the Indonesian 
Republic in the late 1940s. In particular, it will pay close attention to how relations with the 
new Indonesian Republic were shaped by the advent of decolonisation as well as the arrival 
of the Cold War in Asia.  
Chapter Two discusses the growing political instability in Indonesia from the mid-1950s. In 
this period, Indonesian domestic politics became increasingly unstable, particularly with the 
revival of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) and the advent of ‘Guided Democracy.’ 
This series of developments alarmed policy-makers in Australia and the United States. The 
chapter will then look at the deliberations in Washington D.C that led to the adoption of a 
covert CIA-led strategy to counter this leftward shift.  
Chapter Three will deal with Australian perceptions of the growing instability in Indonesia. 
In particular, it will deal with fears of the growing power of the PKI, the increasingly visible 
involvement of the Soviet Union and People’s Republic of China in Indonesian affairs and 
the growing tensions between Australian and Indonesia over West New Guinea. The chapter 
will also deal with Australian involvement in the decision-making around the covert 
American support for the rebels of Sumatra and Suluwesi.  
Chapter Four will focus on the decline in rebel fortunes beginning in April 1958. As the 
covert strategy adopted by the Eisenhower Administration and supported by the Menzies 
government collapsed; both Australia and the United States scrambled for alternative options. 
12 
 
In this context, Australia and the United States viewed the Indonesian Army as the only 
viable anti-Communist force on the archipelago. For Australia, it also meant a serious re-
evaluation on the issue of West New Guinea, a source of major contention with Indonesia. 
This political and diplomatic history seeks to highlight the Australian involvement in a 
crucial episode of the Cold War in the Third World. It also enquiries into the little understood 
evolution of Australian-Indonesian bilateral relations an important addition to the story of 
how Australia approached this dynamic and turbulent region post-1945.  
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Chapter One 
 
 
The United States and Indonesia in context 
In the course of the Second World War, the United States became the predominant power in 
Southeast Asia. With this power came responsibility. American officials from President 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt down were increasingly concerned with the future of a region that 
had been the domain of European colonial powers for centuries. The Japanese southward 
thrust in 1941-42 had exposed the weaknesses of the colonial system, and provoked within 
the political elite in Washington D.C serious discussions on whether European imperialism 
would survive.
13
   
 
Roosevelt, like President Woodrow Wilson before him saw that the United States had a 
unique mission to reshape the world, which included a distaste of European colonialism. For 
Roosevelt, his advancement of the proposition of gradual decolonisation was rooted in 
America’s anti-colonial heritage, post-war planning, and national self-interest.14 This was 
reflected in the Atlantic Charter signed in August 1941.  American officials in the White 
House and State Department saw economic nationalism-autarky- with its trade barriers, 
exchange controls, and discriminatory practices as the reason why the world had gone to war. 
European colonialism, with its exclusive economic connections between the metropolitan 
centre and resource-producing periphery clashed with the American principles of expanded 
free trade and investment.
15
  
 
However, by 1944-45, a more gradualist approach towards the self-determination of 
European colonial empires was adopted. The Roosevelt Administration became less 
                                                          
13
 Gary R. Hess, The United States’ Emergence as a Southeast Asian Power, 1940-1950 (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1987), 47-49. 
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 H.W Brands, Traitor to his Class: The privileged life and radical presidency of Franklin Delano Roosevelt (New 
York: Anchor Books, 2009), 661-663. See also Bradley Simpson, “Bernath Lecture The United States and the 
Curious History of Self-Determination,” Diplomatic History 36 (2012): 675-677. 
15
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Columbia University Press, 1999), 14-19. 
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aggressive in pushing for trusteeships under the nascent United Nations Organisation, to 
establish self-determination in the colonised world.
16
 The need for cooperation with Western 
European powers on post-war security and economic recovery in the United Nations meant it 
was vital that countries such as the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, and Portugal 
were not alienated by American policy. Also by late 1944, serious doubts were being raise in 
Washington about the viability of post-war cooperation with the Soviet Union over actions by 
the Red Army in Eastern Europe.
17
 Instead of damning denunciations of imperialism, the 
United States encouraged its European allies to adopt a more moderate approach to the 
dismantling of colonial rule. The American example of the development of self-governing 
institutions in the Philippines was considered the optimal approach.
18
  
 
The Truman Administration and Indonesian Revolution 
From the very outset, Harry S. Truman confronted several major foreign policy challenges. 
Indonesia, at first did not occupy much serious attention in the Administration, even as Dutch 
troops and officials tried to wrestle back control by any means from newly created Indonesian 
nationalist regime. As tensions with the Soviet Union increased, the energies of President 
Truman and his key foreign policy advisors were primarily absorbed in Europe and the 
Middle East. Even when they did look at Asia, it was through the prism of China and Japan. 
For Europeanist in the State Department such as Under-Secretary then Secretary of State 
Dean Acheson, the tiers monde (third world) as French sociologist Alfred Sauvy defined it 
was an untested arena prone to chaos.
19
  
Acheson and other government officials believed it was foolish to become too attached to the 
idealism of anti-colonialism when Western Europe was in dire need of support against Soviet 
expansionism as articulated by George F. Kennan in his famous “long telegram” on future 
Soviet behaviour.
20
 This Europe first mindset was not just a product of those at the 
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19
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20
 Telegram, George Kennan to James Byrnes (Long Telegram), 22 February 1946. Harry S. Truman 
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commanding heights of the foreign policy establishment. The newly formed State 
Department Policy Division for South-East Asia, staffed by numerous academics with an 
interest in particular countries or peoples in the region rather than the totality of American 
interests, clashed repeatedly with their counterparts at the European desks.  John F. Cady, a 
former research analyst for the OSS, then officer with South-East Asia Policy division reflect 
that “[A]nything that had to do with explaining the Indonesian situation had to be cleared by 
the Dutch desk in the Western European group…there was little possibility of formulating 
any independent policy as far as the South-East Asian Division was concerned... The 
Southeast Asia Division recommended certain policies with the European Division people 
normally opposing them.”21 
 
Cady saw the obstructionists that stifled the policies of his division that were rooted in the 
traditionalist approach of the European desk officers. “The basic issue of disagreement was 
simple; Europe was important from their point of view and responsibility, while Southeast 
Asia was comparatively unimportant. They refused, as a rule, to say anything or do anything 
that might embarrass their relations with the local French, Dutch, or British Embassy.”22 
Philip Trezise, advisor to the U.S. delegation to the UN Commission on Indonesia summed 
up the dichotomy faced my American officials “[I]n Indonesia, if I could interpret what went 
on in the minds of policymakers, we were torn between two rather obvious considerations. 
One, the Dutch, who had been our allies in the war (which had just ended, after all) had 
suffered quite badly and were an integral part of the Western European structure that we were 
trying to rebuild and bring back to a full part in world affairs. It wasn't easy. On the other 
hand, here were the Indonesians, struggling as American colonies had once struggled against 
the foreign master.”23 However, the United States was committed to its European allies and 
their rehabilitation in order to confront the Soviet Union. In these circumstances, the middle 
ground between decolonisation and the return of European colonialism was seen as the best 
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option. The United States would support the right of European powers to regain sovereign 
territory lost during the war. However, the United States hoped to encourage these powers to 
adopt a gradual process of decolonisation that would lead to the emergence of stable nation-
states friendly towards the West (and the United States).   
 
With this policy of being a moderation influence in mind, the United States adopted a neutral 
policy towards the simmering conflict between the Indonesian Republic and the Dutch. The 
Truman Administration hoped a negotiated diplomatic settlement could be achieved which 
would allowed for self-determination with Dutch acquiescence while avoiding an armed 
clash. Washington saw the Linggadjatti Agreement in November 1946 as the first step 
towards eventual self-rule for Indonesia, while preserving Dutch political, military and most 
importantly its economic stake on the archipelago.
24
  
For the Dutch political class, business community, and public, there was a general fear that 
economic hardship more serious that the Great Depression would result if the trade and 
wealth of the Indies was not regained. International prestige also played a significant role in 
the Dutch desire to retain the Indies. Without Indonesia, the Netherlands would “sink to the 
rank of Denmark.”25 The United States due to its concern for Western Europe, acquiesced 
with the Dutch desire for a continued economic role in the Indies. However, this was to be 
achieved through diplomacy, i.e Linggadjatti. The high hopes manifested in the agreement 
did not last long. The Dutch were not willing to grant self-rule on terms that satisfied the 
Indonesian nationalists. In these circumstances, the Dutch resorted to armed force to achieve 
a settlement on the 20
th
 of July 1947.
26
  
 
Between July 1947 and the end of the Dutch-Indonesian war in December 1949, the United 
States became increasingly concerned about the impact of this conflict on regional security 
and the security of the United States. American political leaders became increasingly strident 
in their desire to see an end to the fighting for several reasons. 
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The growing financial cost of the war worried the United States.  By 1948, there were tens of 
thousands of Dutch troops engaged in a protracted guerrilla war with nationalist forces. The 
burden of maintaining this vast force in what was proving to be an intractable conflict was 
fast becoming an immense headache for the Dutch treasury. Dutch troops were meant to be 
securing the vital plantations and raw materials essential to the Netherlands post-war 
recovery. Instead, by 1948, exports from the Indies had not reached their pre-war levels and 
earned virtually nothing. With Marshal Plan aid flowing into the Netherlands, the United 
States again pushed for a negotiated solution, which would see American taxpayers’ money 
not used to crush a nationalist revolt.
27
  
The Madiun revolt, solidified for the Truman Administration that they were dealing with a 
nationalist organisation intent on undermining the influence of Communism. The revolt, 
launched by the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) in September 1948, was a reaction by the 
Communists to the failure of mainstream nationalist figures to negotiate with the Dutch for 
independence. Republican forces quickly crushed the uprising in the city of Madiun, with 
Mohammed Hatta playing a decisive role.
28
 For the United States, the Indonesian 
government’s brutal crushing of this Communist attempt to gain political control meant that 
the Indonesians could be relied upon as allies in the Cold War, particularly as the region 
seemed increasingly vulnerable. This realisation pushed the United States in an increasingly 
pro-Indonesian and pro-independence direction.  
The conflict between the Dutch and the Indonesian Republicans was also undermining U.S. 
interests in the international arena. In the United Nations, unilateral Dutch military 
aggression, particularly its police actions violated the key tenants of the organisation.   In a 
CIA report dated 27 January 1949 the outcome of these on Dutch police actions would be 
that: “[P]ersistent Dutch disregard of SC (Security Council) directives will drastically reduce 
the prestige and influence of the United Nations because it will demonstrate again that UN 
resolutions, however mild, stand little chance of obtaining compliance unless backed by 
effective sanctions. Defiance displayed by such a state as the Netherlands, which enjoys long-
established traditions of Western democracy and enlightenment, will have a peculiarly 
destructive effect on the basic concept of international law and order.”29  
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American acquiescence in Dutch military actions, strained efforts to build cooperative 
relations with newly independent states such as India, Pakistan and Ceylon (Sri Lanka).These 
states, already ambivalent about the threat posed by the Soviet Union, sought to promote 
security solutions in the region without the involvement of the U.S. In the same CIA report, it 
stated that “[D]utch action in Indonesia has given Asiatic nations a rallying point for effective 
expressions of Far Eastern solidarity; has presented India with an opportunity to assert 
leadership in the area, and may have precipitated the emergence of an Asiatic bloc whose 
ultimate influence can be unfavourable to the US.”30  
 
 
Indonesian Independence in a dangerous world 
The Dutch-Indonesian agreement signed at The Hague on the 2 November 1949 was a 
vindication for American foreign policy. Indonesian independence for the Truman 
Administration was a success for American ideals and national security. In the context of the 
Cold War, the advent of a nationalist regime in Indonesia with strong anti-communist 
credentials was a victory. Indonesians of all political stripes and backgrounds were grateful 
for the eventual support the United States had provided to their embattled nation. President 
Sukarno referred to “America as the mother” of the Indonesian republic. Sentiments well 
received in the White House and at Foggy Bottom. However, Sukarno clarified this statement 
by noting “the new young Asiatic countries (including Indonesia) are grown sons who looked 
to their mother with affection and understanding but who did not wish her to interfere with 
the running of their own lives.”31  This contention would have a major effect on bilaterial 
relations between Indonesia and the United States during both the Truman and Eisenhower 
Administrations.  
By 1949-50, regional and international developments were changing the scope of American 
foreign policy towards Southeast Asia and Indonesia. In August 1949, the Soviet Union 
detonated an atomic device. In a flash, according to Melvyn Leffler, the United States had not 
only lost its nuclear monopoly but a Soviet Union equipped with  nuclear weapons raised 
fears in Washington that Soviet penchant for risk-taking and blackmail abroad might 
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increase.
32
 These fears gained further currency when Mao Tse-tung and the Chinese 
Communist Party achieved total victory by routing the Guomindang forces of Chiang Kai-
shek.  Mao’s declaration of the People’s Republic of China in October 1949 was viewed as a 
major loss for the Truman Administration.
33
 Communist authority had expanded to China; 
the Guomindang in which Washington had invested so much hope and political capital were 
defeated, and Mao was intent on “leaning to one side” in the Cold War by signing a bilateral 
alliance with Stalin in February 1950.
34
  For American officials in the White House, State, 
and Defence Departments, the expansion of Communism into East Asia threatened the 
security of Southeast Asia.  
 
Southeast Asia, was crucial to the grand strategy of “containment” adopted the Truman 
Administration. At the heart of “containment” was binding the industrial centres of Western 
Europe and Northeast Asia to the United States. However, this could only be accomplished if 
there was stability in the underdeveloped periphery. The rehabilitation of Japan as a pro-
Western bastion depended on access to markets and materials in Southeast Asia. Sayuri 
Guthrie-Shimizu noted that American policy-makers in occupied Japan were well aware of 
the importance of foreign trade to the resource-poor island nation.
35
 As the People’s 
Liberation Army advanced to the borders of French Indochina and the region was disrupted 
throughout 1948 and 1949 by Communist-led rebellions in Indonesia, Burma, Malaya and the 
Philippines, American officials wondered whether history was on the side of Communism in 
Southeast Asia. The young Congressman Richard M. Nixon, and future red-baiter, declared 
in relation to China “The deck was stacked on the communist side of the table.”36  A Policy 
Planning Staff (PPS) study that became NSC 48/2 noted “with China being overwhelmed by 
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Communism, Southeast Asia represents a vital segment on the line of containment, stretching 
from Japan southward to the Indian peninsular.”37  
When North Korean tanks rolled over the 38
th
 parallel on the 25 June 1950 into South Korea, 
it furthered the imperative to strengthen the Western position on China’s southern frontier. 
The intervention of China on the side of the North Koreans and the bitter fighting that 
occurred between UN forces-that were predominantly American- and Chinese forces made 
Asia the new central battlefield of the Cold War. Officials from President Truman and 
Secretary of State Dean Acheson down feared that Chinese intervention in Korea was a 
precursor to further aggressive moves in Southeast Asia. Moves that would undermine the 
Japanese economic revival, hinder the recovery of Western Europe and apocalyptically bring 
170 million people and the vast resources of the region under Kremlin control.
38
  
Indonesia did not initially register as being in danger of being overcome by Communist 
subversion or aggression in the early 1950s. According to the Melby-Erskine military survey 
mission that toured the region following the outbreak of the Korean War, Indonesia ranked 
fourth behind Indochina, Thailand and the Philippines in terms of American priorities.
39
 In 
Indochina, where the French were locked in a vicious war with the Viet Minh led by Ho Chi 
Minh, the Truman Administration officially recognised the Emperor Bao Dai as leader of the 
French backed Free Vietnam, as well as providing massive amounts of military and economic 
aid. In the case of Thailand and the Philippines, the United States signed bilateral alliances 
with both countries to solidify the line of containment in the region.
40
  
Indonesia due to its geographical location meant it was not under imminent threat of 
Communist aggression. Also, the known anti-communism of many Indonesian nationalist 
leaders meant it was not the key focus of containment in Southeast Asia. However, with its 
essential raw materials and location astride major shipping and communication lanes, the 
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Truman Administration wished to integrate Indonesia firmly within the “containment” 
strategy in Southeast Asia.
41
 At its most ambitious, the United States sought to establish a 
mutual defence agreement with the Indonesian Republic. Its approach ran up against the 
neutralism espoused by Indonesian leaders. The Indonesian nationalist leadership that had 
just won its countries independence were suspicious of both superpowers.
42
 While thankful 
for the support the United States had offered in the struggle for independence, Indonesian 
leaders had noted that the Truman Administration had only become involved when it was in 
their self-interest. Also, the United States had been responsible for allowing the Dutch to 
retain control of Irian Jaya for the time being, pending further bilateral negotiations.  
Although not a major issue until the mid-1950s, Dutch control of Irian Jaya would remain a 
raw wound for Indonesian nationalists of all political persuasions.  The Soviet Union was 
also viewed with mistrust, since many Indonesian nationalists saw a Soviet hand in the 
Madiun Uprising.
43
 Indonesia, like Burma, India, and Sri Lanka wished to proceed with a 
non-aligned, neutral foreign policy, with an emphasis on the independence of Indonesian 
actions on the international stage. This principle known as bebas aktif (free and active) was 
first articulated by Dr Mohommed Hatta  in September 1948 in reaction to growing rivalry 
between the Soviet Union and United States and its impact on Indonesian international 
identity and domestic political rivalries.
44
 Remy Madinier notes that the ideological contest 
between what Odd Arne Westad calls the American “Empire of Liberty” and the Soviet 
“Empire of Justice” was reverberating through Indonesian domestic politics in the early 
1950s.
45
 This was particularly pronounced between the moderate Islamist party Masjumi and 
the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) and its affiliates. This contest, made increasingly 
vitriolic by memories of the Madiun rebellion, in which Masjumi supporters were summarily 
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executed by troops allied with the PKI, ensured that any commitment to either side in the 
bipolar Cold War struggle would provoke major unrest.
46
    
In this domestic environment and with neutralism favoured by the Indonesian political elite, 
American attempts to gain any type of binding alliance with the Indonesian Republic were 
doomed to failure. In late 1951-early 1952, in the midst of fighting in Korea, United States 
Ambassador to Indonesia Cochran, hoped to end Indonesia’s non-alignment by getting the 
pro-western Sukiman government to sign up to the Mutual Security Act Agreement. In 
signing onto the Mutual Security Act, the Indonesian Republic would receive much needed 
military aid, to not only modernise the Indonesian armed forces but to counter the threat of 
military revolts and the Darul Islam insurgency on Java.
47
 However, in signing the Act the 
Indonesian Republic had to subscribe to article 511(a) of the Act, that stipulated that it had to 
contribute “to the defensive strength of the free world.” Article 511(b) noted that to receive 
reimbursable military aid or technical and economic aid the recipient country only need to 
pledge to contribute to “maintain…world peace and to take such actions as may be mutually 
agreed upon to eliminate causes of international tensions.” Cochran, going against the advice 
of the State Department, cajoled the Indonesians to secretly accept the more binding 511(a) 
article rather than 511(b).
48
  
 
The agreement, signed between Cochran and Foreign Minister Subardjo, provoked a 
domestic firestorm when its contents were revealed to the Indonesian press as well as 
members of the Sukiman cabinet. The episode resulted in the collapse of the Sukiman 
government and widespread distrust of American motives. This episode highlights the 
divergence between American Cold War priorities in the region and the desire of the 
Indonesian government to avoid choosing sides in the superpower confrontation. As regional 
unrest gripped Indonesia throughout 1957-1958, the Eisenhower Administration’s 
antagonism towards neutralism and the growing leftward shift in Indonesian politics, caused 
the United States to intervene to halt what it perceived to be a danger to the containment 
doctrine in Southeast Asia.  
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Australia, Indonesia, and the Region: From World War to Cold War 
To understand how the Australian government confronted the outbreak of rebellion in 
Indonesia in 1958, it is vital to understand its context, that being the end of European empire 
and the Cold War in Asia. Between 1941 and 1945, Australia had endured a long and bitter 
conflict with Imperial Japan, a nation that had sought hegemony in East and Southeast Asia. 
During this conflict-particularly in 1942- Australia faced a direct threat, with Japanese forces 
attacking the mainland and defeating Australian and allied forces. In the post-1945 world, the 
Australian foreign policy establishment would use the lessons of 1942 to confront the dangers 
of decolonisation and the Cold War in Asia. The Imperial Japanese southward thrust in 1941-
42, terminally damaged the European colonial system that had existed since the 16
th
 century.  
In 1939, European colonial officials would have noted that the global colonial order was 
strained due to the impact of the Great Depression and nascent nationalist movements , but 
not on the verge of collapse. Within a generation, it was gone. The Japanese military 
victories, ended European dominance-both physically and psychologically- in Southeast Asia 
and unleashed a nationalist upsurge throughout the region. Following Japan’s surrender in 
September 1945, the returning European colonial powers confronted a region completely 
transformed. David Reynolds notes that the collapse of the European colonial order in the 
region caused Australian politicians and diplomats to rethink how Australia approached the 
region.
49
  
In the case of the Netherlands East Indies (Indonesia), the returning Dutch found themselves 
engaged in an armed conflict with an infant Indonesian Republic, led by nationalists Achmed 
Sukarno and Mohammed Hatta. For Labor Prime Minister Joseph Chifley and his External 
Affairs Minister Herbery Vere Evatt, this conflict marked a new epoch in Australian 
engagement with the region. Both Chifley and Evatt took a serious interest in the ongoing 
nationalist revolt against Dutch rule. In terms of post-war Australian foreign relations, this 
concern related to Australian national security interests and the commitment of Labor to the 
principles of the United Nations. The rapid collapse of Dutch resistance in the face of the 
Japanese onslaught of 1941-1942 had dangerously exposed Australia to military attack and 
isolation from its major allies.  According to Margaret George, throughout the period from 
1946 to 1949, in the aftermath of the Pacific War, Evatt had asserted a “special” Australian 
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interest in the future of the Netherlands East Indies.
50
 In an address to parliament, Evatt 
enunciated his government’s belief that “Australia stands to Asia, geographically and 
politically in something of the same relationship as the United Kingdom to Europe…like the 
United Kingdom in relation to Europe, Australia cannot afford to be insular in the Pacific.”51 
Throughout this period, Australian politicians and diplomats had tried to moderate the 
conflict while preserving Australia’s unique strategic interests in ensuring a stable settlement, 
and contributing the peace in the region. As firm believers in the newly established United 
Nations and liberal-internationalism, Chifley and Evatt, sought to uphold its mandate in 
relation to the conflict in the Netherlands East Indies not only as a matter of principle but as a 
way of securing Australian interests in a volatile region.  
 
The Menzies Liberal government that was elected in December 1949 viewed the region with 
caution. Unlike their Labor predecessors, the Liberals viewed developments in the region as 
moving in a direction harmful to the Australian national interest. The foreign policy of the 
Labor government of Prime Minister Chifley and External Affairs Minister Evatt according 
to David Lee, stressed the advent of an independent Australian foreign policy, which 
subscribed to the ideals of “liberal-internationalism” and the importance of the United 
Nations in resolving disputes.
52
 Neville Meaney notes that this growing reliance on the 
United Nations was a product of Chifley and Evatt’s  suspicion of the great powers acting 
unilaterally without consulting small/middling powers such as Australia; as was the case 
when the United States, Britain and Nationalist China agreed on Pacific peace terms at the 
Cairo Conference in 1943, without consulting Australia.
53
 This application of liberal-
internationalism to the post-war world reflected a deeper Australian desire to achieve security 
in the Pacific, following the unhappy Australian co-operation with Britain and the United 
States during the war and concerns that European affairs (i.e the nascent Cold War) would 
draw British and American attention away from the Pacific.  
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The Liberal-Country party coalition that was elected in December 1949, brought about a 
significant change in Australian foreign policy. Frank Bongiorno has noted that “1949’’ 
represented a significant watershed in Australian foreign relations
54
, comparable with the 
advent of liberal-internationalism under Labor advocated by Christopher Waters and David 
Lee.
55
 Prime Minister Robert Menzies and his ministers associated with foreign affairs 
advocated a “realist” approach to Australian engagement. In the context of the victorious 
Chinese Communist Party driving Chang Kai Shek forces off the mainland, an unstable 
region with active Communist parties and irreconcilable political, strategic, and ideological 
differences between the United States and the Soviet Union, the Liberals viewed the notion of 
the United Nations offering Australia security in an unstable region as naïve. Australian 
security, according to Menzies and his colleagues, was best guaranteed in cultivating support 
from her traditional ally, Great Britain, and the United States , the pre-eminence great power 
in the region. As the region endured the turmoil of nationalist agitation and violence directed 
at colonial regimes, some of it linked to Communist parties as in the case of Indochina, 
Australian national security was perceived to be under threat from the Communist monolith, 
which now had a regional presence in China.
56
  
The emergence of a unified China under the rule of the Communist Party of Mao Tse-tung in 
1949 and aligned (for the time being) with the Soviet Union provoked deep concern within 
the Australian political elite and within the broader population.
57
  This new China, perceived 
as unitary, seeking rapid industrialization, anti-western, bellicose and already with a 
contemporary history of foreign interventions and subversion (Korea in 1950 and support for 
the Viet Minh war effort from 1951-54) provoked deep concern in Australia. John Murphy 
makes the point that conservative politicians that held power in the 1950s were decidedly 
modernist in their perceptions of contemporary Asia. Instead of seeing the events that were 
occurring in the near north as products of history, resistance to the colonial order, cultural 
                                                          
54
 Frank Bongiorno, “The Price of Nostalgia: Menzies and the “Liberal” tradition and Australian Foreign Policy,” 
Australian Journal of Politics and History 51(2005): 402-403.  
55
 See David Lee and Christopher Waters, eds. Evatt to Evans: The Labor Tradition of Australian Foreign Policy 
(Melbourne: Allen and Unwin, 1997).  
56
 David Mclean, “From British Colony to American Satellite? Australia and the USA during the Cold War,” 
Australian Journal of Politics and History 52(2006), 72-73.  
57
   Frank Bongiorno, “The Price of Nostalgia,” 412-414. 
26 
 
tradition, and emerging nationalism, it was a void in their mental map. A void filled with 
instability and communist penetration.
58
    
In March of 1950, External Affairs minister Percy Spender addressed parliament with this 
mental map firmly established. Communist China posed the greatest threat to the region with 
Moscow at the hub of this expansionist drive.
59
 In this context, Australian politicians and 
diplomats developed a strategic doctrine known as “forward defence.” This doctrine stated 
that Australian national security was best upheld by keeping the Communist threat as far 
away from the Australian mainland as possible. To do so, Australia would have to confront 
militarily the threat posed by Communist China and allied Communist parties to the region 
alongside its allies the United Kingdom and United States. Although Menzies was initially 
ambivalent about the region, and saw Australian security best protected by assisting Britain in 
defending the Middle East from Soviet encroachment
60
, the defeat of the French as Dien Bien 
Phu by the Viet Minh and Britain’s diminishing resources in the region, particularly 
following the Suez Crisis, changed that perspective. In particular, it was deemed that 
Australian security was best upheld by maintaining a substantial American commitment to 
the region, as British influence waned. This American commitment was to be upheld by the 
ANZUS treaty of 1951 and the SEATO treaty of 1954, two alliance commitments intended to 
bind the United States to the region’s future and to Australia’s security.61 However, neither of 
these treaty agreement sprang out of nowhere in the post-1945 world, they were (and still are) 
the culmination of over half a century of Australian diplomatic activity to get the United 
States committed to the region from Alfred Deakin in 1909 to  Joseph Lyon’s attempt at 
creating a “Pacific Pact” involving the United States in 1937. 62 According to David 
Reynolds, the emergence of an assertive Communist China intervening in the same areas as 
Imperial Japan conquered in 1940-42, was a threat that could not be ignored, particularly with 
the lessons of 1942 still fresh in Australian policy-makers minds.
63
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 The emergence of the threat of Communist expansionism combined with old fears that were 
part of the Anglo-Australia psyche. These fears revolved around Australia being an outpost of 
European civilization in an alien region. External Affairs Minister Richard Casey articulated 
this feeling of geopolitical loneliness to Harold Macmillan commenting that if “you were to 
put your left hand on the Eastern Mediterranean and your right hand on the West Coast of 
North America. Between your two hands will be over half the surface of the earth, with 
Australia as the only “white” country (to use an awful word) of consequence in this very 
large area, other than New Zealand. This reflects the remoteness, the loneliness and the 
vulnerability of Australia. ”64  The war against Imperial Japan had aroused what a modern, 
industrialised and militarized Asian nation could do to threaten Australia’s sovereignty and 
survival. 
For both the United States and Australia in the 1950s, Indonesia would become central to 
their concepts of security in the region. As Cold War tensions expanded into East and 
Southeast Asia, the United States increasingly viewed Indonesia as a central pillar in the 
containment strategy in the region, but also as a model of a Western-orientated decolonisation 
process. Australia, that had played a crucial role in assisting Indonesia gain its independence 
look upon its nearest neighbour with both hope and trepidation. Australian politicians and 
diplomats hoped to establish friendly and productive relations with the new Indonesian 
Republic, as a way of furthering Australian regional engagement as well promoting its 
security interests. However, these hopes combined with fears of potential Indonesian 
expansionism and the instability of Indonesian domestic politics proving the scope for 
Communism to advance. By 1955, fears for the stability of Indonesia and the growing 
domestic appeal of Communism were clouding the thoughts of Canberra and Washington 
D.C.  
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Chapter Two 
 
Indonesia at a crossroads 
 
By the mid-1950s, Australian and American government officials were increasingly alarmed 
at the political trajectory of the Indonesian Republic. This was a challenging time for Western 
interests in Southeast Asia. The defeat of the French in Indochina had led to the emergence of 
a Communist state in North Vietnam. The Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO), a 
collective security organisation established in the wake of the Indochina fiasco, remained 
relatively impotent. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union, following the death of Iosif Stalin, was 
looking to the former colonial world as an arena of competition with the United States.
65
 
Indonesia therefore assumed greater significance and its domestic politics, foreign policy and 
leadership struggles were the subject of both great interest and concern. For Canberra and 
Washington, President Sukarno’s embrace of Guided Democracy, the growth of Soviet and 
Chinese aid and political support, and the increasing popularity and electoral success of the 
PKI presented a daunting challenge.
66
  
 
During the 1950s, the Indonesian Communist Party, the PKI, was on the road to recovery 
after its disastrous uprising at Madiun in 1948. Following Madiun, the PKI was accused of 
stabbing the Republican cause in the back, while it was locked in a life-or-death struggle 
against the Dutch. In the aftermath of this catastrophe, the PKI went about reinventing itself 
as a nationalist organisation committed to the goals of the Indonesian Revolution. Under the 
leadership of D.N Aidit, the PKI rebuilt itself as an party committed to the  national ideology 
of Pancasilia (Five Principles) and proved willing to work within the existing parliamentary 
system.
67
 This commitment to national ideology and the political process was matched by its 
massed popular support in Central and Eastern Java. In particular, the PKI was able to draw 
upon the disaffection many Javanese peasants and villagers felt with the fruits of 
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independence. The PKI also sort to endear itself with the greatest hero of the Indonesian 
Revolution, President Sukarno. Sukarno’s semi-mythical reputation as a champion of 
Indonesian nationalism made him the most revered leader on the Indonesian political scene. 
In these circumstances, the PKI sought to align itself with the President’s domestic and 
foreign policy attitudes, particularly on the issue of West Irian.  
 
Officials in Canberra and Washington were well aware of the ascendency of the PKI in 
Indonesian politics. Walter R. Crocker, who served as Australian ambassador in both India 
and Indonesia delivered a frank explanation of the appeal of the PKI to External Affairs 
Minister Richard Casey on the 10
th
 of September 1956. In particular, Crocker highlighted the 
grinding poverty of post-independence Indonesia and the hopelessness that drew Indonesians 
to the PKI. He outlined that “No Indonesian has much wealth to lose so that arguments about 
the interests of private property or the rights of capital fall on deaf ears. On the other hand 
arguments for lessening poverty do not fall on deaf ears.” Crocker went on to elaborate on the 
dire conditions of the Javanese peasantry telling Casey that “In Java itself, unlike in most of 
Indonesia, the stage has been reached in places, thanks to the population problem, where 
there is a landless proletariat and where poverty is real and of a familiar Asian kind. It is not 
without significance that all 39 of the PKI members of parliament represent Java 
constituencies.”68 
 
The general elections of 1955-the first since independence- were a watershed moment for the 
PKI. These elections, held in September of 1955, marked its re-emergence as a significant 
national political player. As Crocker, a diplomat with extensive experience in the developing 
world, noted to Casey, the PKI were able to achieve major successes particularly on Java. In 
the general elections, the PKI polled 6,176,914 votes and gained 16.4% of the vote placing 
them in fourth position overall. The gains achieved by the PKI reflected poorly on the 
traditionally pre-dominant parties in Indonesia, the Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI) and 
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the moderate Islamist Masjumi. Respectively, the PNI and Masjumi polled 22.3% and 20.9% 
of the vote.
69
  
 
The significant increase in the political appeal of the PKI can be traced to several factors. 
Firstly, the party re-entered the Indonesian political mainstream as a party clothed in the 
rhetoric and ideals of the Indonesian revolution. In an interview for the New York Times on 
the 11
 
December 1954 - that was documented by the Australia embassy in Jakarta- PKI leader 
D.N Aidit reasserted the commitment of the PKI to the Indonesian revolutionary principles of 
Pancasila and surprisingly “freedom of religion”, a realistic assessment of the role of religion 
in Indonesian society.
70
 Duly noted by the Australian Embassy was the ability of the PKI to 
integrate itself into many aspects of Indonesian civil society including students, ex-soldiers, 
squatters, women and extreme nationalist organisations for the return of West Irian-a vital 
aspect in terms of the Australian national interest and Indonesian nationalism.
71
  
Secondly, the PKI ran an effective and efficient campaign that played to their strengths. 
According to Dutch figures from 1938-39 only 204 Indonesian graduated from high school 
out of a population of 67 million.
72
 In these circumstances, the PKI developed a sophisticated 
campaign empathising communal/village loyalty and issues; particularly in a country where 
over 90% of the population were peasants or communal proprietors. The strategy ensured that 
88.6% of the votes in Java and 75% in Central and Eastern Java alone went to the PKI, 
regions as noted above that were drawn to its ideals. However, the outer-islands, particularly 
Sumatra, remained strongholds of the Masjumi, due to the nature of Islam on the island and 
Sumatra being a primarily export orientated economy compared to Java’s rice and 
agricultural basis.
73
  
The general elections of 1955 reflected the vibrancy, competitiveness, and diversity of 
opinions in the Indonesian political system. However, the results of this hard-fought 
campaign did not solve the inherent problems that had blighted Indonesia since 
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independence. These included an unstable and cumbersome cabinet system, an economy that 
was struggling to recover from both the Japanese occupation and the war against the Dutch, 
and a population weary with the continual political bickering and horse-trading between the 
main parties. President Sukarno, the hero of independence and symbol of the Indonesian 
Revolution, was well aware of the growing disenchantment of his fellow Indonesians, 
because he felt the same way.
74
  
 
Many Indonesians had hoped that the elections of 1955 would be a panacea to the problems 
afflicting the country, cleansing the country of its post-independence ills. While immensely 
proud of their revolutionary struggle against the Dutch, Indonesians were not seeing the 
benefits of independence. Corruption, poverty and the inability of the government to deal 
with inflation added to a general economy malaise that undermined the post-1949 idealism. 
While Indonesians of all political, ethnic and religious stripes were proud of the stand the 
country had taken on the international stage, particularly in support of the non-aligned 
movement (the Bandung conference) and its commitment to support anti-colonialism, their 
political elite left much to be desired. The pettiness of the squabbling between parties and the 
lack of a consensus on the direction the country should be taking was seen by many as a 
betrayal of the ideals of the revolution.
75
  
Even more disturbing for the future of the nation was the growing regional unrest on the 
islands of Sumatra and Suluwesi. Due to the geographical and anthropological spread of the 
Indonesian archipelago, ethnic identity and regional diversity are self-evident factors in the 
politics of the Indonesian Republic. While relatively united in their struggle against Dutch 
colonialism, dissatisfaction with central control from Java and a desire for local autonomy 
became a worrying aspect of post-independence politics. Regional animosity towards the 
central government had its roots in several economic, political, and military issues. The 
Outer-Islands demanded a greater share of public spending on roads, hospitals and other 
government services and infrastructure. Outer-Islanders also chafed under the artificial 
exchange rates which penalised the export-producing areas (such as Sumatra) in order to 
support the island of Java, which was a net consumer.
76
 The passing of Vice-President Hatta- 
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a Sumatran- from the political scene in December 1956, added further to disquiet in the 
Outer-Islands. The Sukarno-Hatta partnership or Dw-Tunggal had symbolised more than 
anything else the unity of the Indonesian Republic-and of Java and Sumatra. Hatta’s decision 
to relinquish the vice-presidency and return to private life left Sukarno as the premier 
revolutionary actor on the Indonesian political stage. Many Outer-Islanders feared for their 
future prospects with Sukarno playing a more prominent role-due to the nature of his 
Javanese background and disposition.
77
  
 
Military affairs and personal rivalry added to this brew of discontent. Attempts by the central 
government in Jakarta to centralise command structures, streamline regional army 
commands, demobilise large amounts of superfluous troops and crackdown on corruption 
fuelled a growing rift. For regional commanders, attempts by Jakarta to undermine their 
commands were greeted with dismay. Many of these officers, particularly on Sumatra and 
Suluwesi, had been able to reap large profits by protecting smuggling operations that moved 
goods such as rubber and tin from Sumatra or Suluwesi to Singapore or the Philippines, 
bypassing central government exchange controls. Attempts by Jakarta to interfere with this 
lucrative trade provoked a strong backlash from regional military leaders that would 
eventually result in the armed rebellion of 1958.
78
 
The central political actor in the growing disquiet over the nature of Indonesian politics was 
President Sukarno. With the inability of various party coalitions to solve the major political 
and economic problems affecting the Republic, Sukarno increasingly stepped into the void. 
By the mid-1950s, Sukarno became increasingly independent in his political thoughts and 
actions. Throughout 1956, Sukarno began to articulate a new concept to address the political 
and economic ills faced by the Republic. For Sukarno, the bitter party conflicts were sapping 
the idealism and dynamism that defined Indonesian politics during the period 1945-49.  
 
Sukarno blamed this political malaise on the western liberal democratic system that had been 
adopted by the Indonesians. In his speech at the opening of parliament in March of 1956, he 
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argued that the Western convention of majority rule (fifty percent plus one) was unsuited for 
the realities of Indonesian society. He implored the newly elected members of parliament to 
seek consensus in the spirit of the Indonesian principle of gotong royong (mutual help).
79
 In 
his search for a new consensus approach to governance, Sukarno would seek assistance from 
abroad.  
 
Throughout the second half of 1956, the president travelled throughout Western Europe, the 
United States, and Soviet Union on a highly publicised world tour. In front of the world’s 
media, Sukarno, ever the showman, dazzled. In the United States, his homage to the 
American political system and its leaders at a joint session of Congress on the 17 May was 
greeted with standing ovation after standing ovation by an American political establishment 
that had expressed its scepticism with the neutralist policies adopted by Indonesia.  At 
Heidelburg University in West Germany where Sukarno was received with a honourary 
degree, the president articulated for a European audience the Indonesian principles of 
Pancasilia.
80
 In the Soviet Union, he toasted with Soviet Premier Nikitia Khrushchev the 
achievements of Lenin and the Soviet Union. However, the flowing rhetoric, did not equate 
with Sukarno’s own beliefs on the future of Indonesia being linked to either society. While in 
awe of the achievements of Washington, Jefferson, and Lincoln, Sukarno saw the American 
model of development and democracy as incompatible with Indonesian political realities. The 
United States was too rich, too well developed and too immersed in the tradition of liberal 
democracy to be an example. Indonesia, which was struggling with the relics of feudalism, 
colonialism, and economic injustice, was too far behind the United States to be a model of 
Indonesia’s future. In the Soviet Union, Sukarno expressed his amazement at the level of 
industrialisation and reconstruction “by countries behind the Iron Curtain.”  However, even 
with expressions of anti-colonial solidarity the trip did not seriously move Indonesia towards 
the Soviet Union.
81
  
 
The country in the end that appealed to Sukarno’s desire for unity of purpose, modernisation 
and industrialisation was Communist China. According to the historian Hong Liu, what 
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captivated Sukarno about China’s immense progress- although at the cost of millions of lives- 
was not its Communist ideology, but the shared purpose and unity of the Chinese people 
under the rule of Chairman Mao. In the example of China, Sukarno saw a fellow Asian nation 
that like Indonesia had endured the humiliation of the colonial experience.
82
 Sukarno, as a 
revolutionary leader, had paid close attention to Chinese political and social developments 
through the early part of his career. He had read the works of the key Chinese nationalists of 
the era, Sun Yat-sen, Mao Tse-tung, and even Chiang Kai-shek. He was also well acquainted 
with developments in China through his interaction with the sizable ethnic Chinese 
community in Indonesia. As Odd Arne Westad has stated, overseas Chinese community were 
fundamental in the shaping of mainland Chinese political thought and actions as well as 
indigenous non-Chinese nationalists.
83
 During his visiting in 1956, Sukarno was able to 
compare the growth and development of China with the sclerotic Indonesian political system. 
In a report to Secretary of State Dulles, Ambassador Allison sent on the 22 July 1957 
summarised a series of speeches Sukarno made to audiences throughout Kalimantan 
Province. During these speeches Sukarno highlighted “the Chinese Peoples Republics 
[philosophy of ] unity, criticism, unity facilitating development of[sic] that nation of 600 
million people” He also expressed how “very impressed by big progress in reconstruction” 
the PRC had made.
84
 During the 1 October military parade in Peking (Beijing) that Sukarno 
attended, Chairman Mao pointed out that much of the military equipment was Chinese-
made.
85
 While the veracity of this claim from the Chairman is dubious-due to the high level 
of Soviet aid the PRC was still receiving- it no doubt showed an Asian nation which not only 
exhibited unity, economic progress and military modernisation.  
The revelations Sukarno would take away from this trip would be an impetus to develop the 
idea of gotong royong. On the 21 October, on returning from his trip to China, Sukarno 
outlined his konsepsi to deal with Indonesia’s ills in a speech entitled “Bury the parties”. 
Throughout 1956 and into 1957, Sukarno went about articulating what became known as 
Guided Democracy, a term he had first used in 1950.
86
 The key aspects of Guided 
Democracy that Sukarno wished to promote were the failures of western liberal democracy or 
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“free fight liberalism” to deals with the political and economic needs of the Indonesian 
people. He proposed a solution more applicable to Indonesia’s unique circumstances. Firstly, 
a new national council would be created to advise the cabinet. This council, appointed by the 
President would include both regional groups as well as other functional groups in society 
such as workers, women, veterans, youths, religious leaders and intellectuals. Secondly, 
Sukarno’s konsepsi called for the creation of a cabinet made up of the four major political 
parties from the 1955 general election. This meant that the Indonesian Communist party-that 
had been excluded from all previous cabinets- would be able to enter the political 
mainstream.
87
 Finally, a plea that all Indonesian “  place interest of the state before group or 
individual interest.” A clear denunciation of what Sukarno perceived to be the venal party 
system, a by-product of colonialism that stifled indigenous political ideas. Sukarno, in his 
“Year of Decision” speech on the 17 August 1957 spoke of the failure of western liberal 
democracy in an Indonesian context “ we are suffering from talkativeness and miscept of 
democracy…It has become apparent that democracy without discipline, democracy without 
guidance, is not in keeping with identity Indonesian people and mental outlook Indonesian 
nation [sic].”88 What alarmed diplomats and politicians in both the United States and 
Australia was the inclusion political system that Sukarno wished to replace the existing one 
would potentially give the ever-growing PKI a role in governance. Western diplomats 
reporting from Jakarta found Sukarno’s courting of the PKI naïve and that he had softened in 
his attitude towards Communism since the Madiun uprising. With memories of how popular-
front governments in Europe had been subverted by Communist Parties- the example of 
Czechaslovakia in 1948 being the most well regarded- Guided Democracy was greeted with 
caution.  
American concerns over Indonesia’s Future 
From the general elections of 1955 onwards, the United States viewed the leftward shift of 
the Indonesian electorate, and the seemingly naïve response of President Sukarno with deep 
concern. In a telegram sent from the embassy in Jakarta to the State Department on the 7
 
October 1955, Ambassador Cummings expressed his disappointment with the success of the 
PKI. In particular, the failure of Masjumi, a moderate Islamist  party with a pro-Western 
orientation, to gain “enough seats in new Parliament to give them a commanding voice in 
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[the] formation [of] new government and policies.”89 The growing presence of the PKI in 
Indonesian national politics, and its inclusion in Sukarno’s concept of Guided Democracy 
was an alarming sign in Washington, particularly as the United States government sought to 
sure up anti-Communist allies and build confidence in the SEATO alliance.  
The strategic value of Indonesia combined with an assertive Eisenhower Administration 
“New Look” strategy; that emphasised the importance of ensuring the alignment of Indonesia 
in the capitalist/free world. A National Security Council (NSC) policy statement from the 19 
November 1953, reiterated the importance of denying Indonesia’s strategic position, natural 
resources and population to the Soviet bloc. At the core of the Eisenhower Administration’s 
commitment to containing Communism in South East and East Asia was the reintegration of 
Japan into the capitalist system and its continual pro-western political alignment. David 
Painter noted the vital importance of Southeast Asian raw materials in this process. If the 
workshop of Asia was to remain an American ally, access to the raw materials necessary for 
reconstruction and economic rejuvenation were essential. Indonesia, with its abundance of 
raw and strategic materials such as rubber, tin, palm oil and the crucial oil deposits in 
Sumatra, was at the core of this strategy.
90
 
The advent of the New Look policy did not mark a radical shift in official American thinking 
on South East Asia. It simply reemphasised the importance of the region (which included 
Indonesia), a view expressed by the Truman Administration. The “Basic National Security 
Policy” approved by President Eisenhower in October 1953-known as NSC162/2-stated that 
the loss of the “uncommitted areas” of the world to the USSR “would greatly, perhaps 
decisively, alter the world balance of power to our (the United States) detriment.” In order to 
counter this decisive change to the global balance of power, the same document 
recommended that the United States should use “all feasible measures” to reduce a Soviet 
threat wherever they existed.
91
 The Soviets and their Chinese allies were seen to pose a major 
threat through their use of subversion, political warfare and local communist armed action. In 
particular, NSC 162/2 highlighted the actions of communist parties and communist-party 
controlled trade unions outside the Bloc as vehicles used by the Soviets to undermine the free 
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world through sabotage, exploitation of subversive and revolutionary movements and of civil 
wars, and psychological warfare.
92
 
 
While asserting an interventionist approach to dealing with potential challenges in the Third 
World, NSC 162/2 outlined the dilemma of Third World nationalism, an issue that would 
decisively shape the coming crisis for the Eisenhower Administration in Indonesia. The 
report acknowledged that resentment towards the West in the Third World was one of many 
obstacles to dealing with regimes such as the one in Jakarta. These nations were “so 
preoccupied with other pressing problems” such as economic growth, ethnic tensions, 
governance and poverty that they were “presently unwilling to align themselves actively with 
the United States and its allies.” Understanding Third World nationalism therefore required 
political finesse to overcome the raw wounds of European colonialism and general distrust of 
Western motives, which provided political ammunition for the Communist bloc. In its 
dealings with Indonesia, the Eisenhower Administration would face the internal 
contradictions of NSC 162/2. In acting assertively to eliminate a perceived threat posed by 
the Soviet bloc and her proxies, President Eisenhower, Secretary of State Dulles and the CIA 
were only adding to the distrust many Third World nationalists expressed towards the United 
States.
93
 
In a private hour-long interview with Sukarno on the 26
 
August 1957, Allison questioned the 
President on his concept of Guided Democracy and the role of the growing PKI. Sukarno, 
probably aware of the concerns of his guest in relation to the PKI sort to ameliorate the 
Ambassador’s concerns by casting the PKI as merely “rabid left-wing nationalists” who had 
“deserted PNI (Nationalist Party) and Masjumi because those parties are no (repeat no) 
longer ardent in their fight against colonialism and imperialism.
94” While the PKI due to its 
continued and well-publicised support for the ending of Dutch rule on West Irian did. 
Sukarno went on to elaborate on why he wished to include the PKI in the concept of Guided 
Democracy. It was not because they were Communists, but “because he (Sukarno) so 
strongly believed in the Indonesian principle of “Gotong-Rojong”. All elements of the 
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community must be represented; there must be mutual cooperation; no (repeat no) group 
should be left out if it consists of a substantial part of the populace.” Allison wondered after 
the conversation whether the President was “either frighteningly naïve or completely 
insincere”. However, Allison made clear to Dulles that Sukarno still maintained a hold on the 
masses greater than any other Indonesian leader.
95
  
 
The brashness of Sukarno in courting the leadership of the PKI and its popular base 
combined with the neutralism of Indonesian foreign policy planted seeds of doubt in 
American official minds. Since independence, Indonesia had sought to maintain its freedom 
of movement in the bipolar world of the Cold War. In the mid-1950s, Indonesia was an 
activist member of the Afro-Asian neutralist bloc, opposed to the actions of both 
superpowers. Sukarno’s hosting of the first meeting of the Afro-Asian bloc in Bandung in 
1955 raised suspicions in Washington, particularly the inclusion of Communist China as one 
of the countries in attendance.
96
 For Indonesia, and the host of the conference President 
Sukarno, non-aligned seemed a natural choice for a country that had only just escaped 
colonial rule.
97
 Like Egypt’s President Abdul Nasser and Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru of 
India, neo-colonialism, remained the greatest danger facing these newly independent states.
98
  
The ruthlessness of the Soviet Union in East Europe and its sabre rattling in the Near East 
and the actions of the United States in adopting a policy of containment were issues of lower 
order. Only through remaining non-aligned could these states achieve genuine independence 
from both great powers.
99
 For many Indonesian, the issue of neo-colonialism, was a raw 
issue, as the Dutch still controlled West Irian. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles saw 
neutralism in the Cold War and in particular in Southeast Asia, as a dangerous phenomenon. 
With his Manichean views of the world, Dulles saw Sukarno as courting disaster in terms of 
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Indonesia’s future.100 Particularly when the PKI was on the rise, the Soviet Union increasing 
its economic and military aid to the Third World and the Chinese Communists were seeking 
to reassure their neighbours.  
 
By mid to late 1957, the patience of the Eisenhower Administration with President Sukarno 
and the direction of Indonesian domestic and foreign policy had run out. Attempts at courting 
the President had yielded few results. In September 1955, Kermit Roosevelt, the political 
action officer who was infamous for organising the overthrow of Prime Minister Mossadegh 
in Iran, had approved the transfer of millions of dollars to support Masjumi in the upcoming 
elections. The money that was converted into rupiah on the Hong Kong black market, yielded 
minimal results as the PKI increased its share of the popular vote.
101
 Increasingly, the use of 
covert operations to change the dynamics in the Indonesian archipelago was seen as a method 
that would halt the leftward shift of Indonesia. The topic of most interest within the CIA and 
the National Security Council was whether it would be better to see Indonesia disintegrate, 
rather than see it dominated by a hostile Communist government.  
 
Southeast Asia was regarded as the region most susceptible to Communist gains by top 
Eisenhower Administration officials. In a private cable to the British Prime Minister Winston 
Churchill dated 4 April 1954, Eisenhower outlined his fears for the region, particularly as 
France struggled to defeat the Viet Minh in Indochina; 
[If] Indochina passes into the hands of the Communists, the ultimate effect on our and 
your global strategic position with the consequent shift in the power ratio throughout 
Asia and the Pacific could be disastrous and, I know, unacceptable to you and me. It is 
difficult to see how Thailand, Burma and Indonesia could be kept out of Communist 
hands. This we cannot afford. The threat to Malaya, Australia and New Zealand would 
be direct. The offshore island chain would be broken. The economic pressures on Japan 
which would be deprived of non-Communist markets and sources of food and raw 
materials would be such, over a period of time, that it is difficult to see how Japan 
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could be prevented from reaching an accommodation with the Communist world which 
would combine the manpower and natural resources of Asia with the industrial 
potential of Japan.
102
 
 
In this context, the importance of the Indonesian archipelago and its political alignment 
would become an issue of vital importance for Washington. In terms of grand strategy, 
Indonesia lay behind the great crescent of states that swept from Japan, down the outer-island 
chain to the Philippines, then bent west towards the Indian sub-continent. It was not a front-
line state like either South Vietnam or Laos in the mid-1950s, rather it was on the second 
defensive line in the mental-map of senior military and diplomatic officials in Washington.
103
 
However, this did not eschew its vital importance. Indonesia, was considered highly 
vulnerable to communist subversion and its loss to the free world would imperil the whole 
region due to its natural resources, control over lines of communication, and strategic value. 
According to Gabriel Kolko, Eisenhower in his first public pronouncement of the “falling 
domino” analogy in April 1954, discussed the danger of losing vital sources of tin, tungsten, 
rubber and oil, if the region fell-raw materials readily available in Indonesia.
104
  
 
Taking the Covert Road 
The New Look emphasis on the use of covert operations, and the priority of preventing 
Indonesia falling to Communism combined in the political, social, and economic turmoil of 
Indonesia in 1957. Prior to 1957, the Eisenhower Administration and the CIA had shown a 
deft (and ruthless) hand in conducting covert operations around the globe. In Iran in 1953, 
Guatemala in 1954 and in Syria in 1957, the CIA had used methods ranging from bribery, 
coup-d’états, covert military intervention, arms supplies and black propaganda to achieve its 
aims.
105
 At a time when the Soviet Union was re-focusing on the third world following the 
death of Stalin and the Chinese Communists were offering an Asian path to revolution, the 
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Eisenhower Administration according to historian John Lewis Gaddis was to find its fears 
confirmed, justifiably on not, throughout the third world.
106
  
The stalemate in Korea at the beginning of his term demonstrated to President Eisenhower 
and his new Secretary of State John Foster Dulles the dangers of large-scale military 
interventions in Asia that could not achieve complete victory. The staggering monetary cost 
of the Korean War and the associated defence expenditure was anathema to the new 
Eisenhower Administration. Ike and this Treasury Secretary George Humphrey saw balanced 
budgets domestically linked to a decrease in costly conventional military spending that had 
expanded the deficit throughout the Korean War.
107
  National Security Council document 
162/2 and the development of the New Look deterrence policy derived from Eisenhower’s 
desire to avoid unsustainable military spending that would harm the American economy and 
civil society. In terms of the New Look strategy in Asia, the administration placed increased 
emphasis on working with local allies to defeat communist threats, the establishment of 
regional collective defence organisations, the threat to use nuclear weapons in localised 
conflicts and the use of covert operations to undermine Communist activity in the region.
108
 
The path to covert intervention in Indonesia had its roots as far back as 1953. During a 
briefing of Ambassador to Indonesia Hugh Cummings in October 1953, President 
Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles elaborated on the potential of Indonesia going 
Communist and how the United States would respond. In particular, the question of the 
territorial unity of Indonesia was raised. Dulles expressed his personal feelings on the matter; 
“ As between a territorially united Indonesia which is leaning and progressing towards 
Communism and a break-up of that country into racial and geographical units, I would prefer 
the latter as furnishing a fulcrum which the United States could work later to help eliminate 
Communism in one place or another, and then in the end, if they so wished arrive back again 
at a united Indonesia.”109 By February 1957, ill-omens within Indonesia, seemed to make this 
policy feasible. At a meeting of the National Security Council on the 28 February 1957, 
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency Allen Dulles (brother of John Foster Dulles) 
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offered a dire warning about the ongoing situation in Indonesia. He stated that “developments 
in Indonesia had taken a dramatic turn, and a critical situation was in the offing. President 
Sukarno is threatening to abandon the experiment in Western forms of democracy, in favour 
of a new concept of government (guided democracy)…Sukarno’s plan has received strong 
backing from the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI)…”110 
 
 In a report by the Intelligence Advisory Committee, the situation in Indonesia was outlined. 
The report makes sombre reading. It noted the growing defiance of regional military 
commanders towards the centre government in Djakarta (Jakarta). These commanders mainly 
from North, Central and South Sumatra demand “a greater degree of autonomy, but have 
given no indication of an intent to quit the Republic. Some have declared a loyalty to 
President Sukarno but have made it clear that they oppose the present cabinet.” The unrest 
and regionalism expressed by these military commanders the report associated with “Poor 
living conditions for the troops [and] outmoded equipment…Repeated appeals to the 
government for funds to carry out improvements in the Army have met with little effective 
response, while the incidence of corruption in high places has destroyed the faith of many 
Army leaders that conditions would improve.” The report also raised the economic 
dislocation between Java and the outer-islands. “The feeling that the government 
administration is dominated by the Javanese, and that the outlying provinces are not receiving 
economic benefits commensurate with their contributions to the government’s revenues have 
added to regional sentiments.”111 The next day during a National Security Council meeting 
Allen Dulles commented on the results of the report stating “ …the Communists in Indonesia 
desired a centralized government because it made it easier for them to effect control…this 
might ultimately raise a policy question for Council consideration-namely, our attitude 
towards federalism as opposed to centralization in Indonesia.”112  
 
Alarm in Washington towards the confused political situation in Indonesia only intensified. 
Increasingly, the situation warranted the intervention by President Eisenhower. During a 
National Security Council discussion on the 14 March, Eisenhower indicated “that we would 
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be up against a very tough problem if we ever had to face the contingency of recognizing 
several governments in the Indonesia area.” The guarded caution of Eisenhower and 
Secretary of State Dulles comments that “Sukarno would compromise” in terms of the 
regional rebellions reflected that a firm commitment on covert intervention had not been 
reached yet. While worried about the leftward drift of Sukarno and the Indonesian political 
system, consensus had not been reached on how to deal with this drift.
113
  
By August 1957, any sense of caution in Washington was being dispelled by political 
developments in Indonesia that necessitated decisive action. During regional elections of that 
year held in Java , the PKI- that had boosted its membership from 165,000 to 1.5 million 
between 1954 and 1959
114
-managed to pick up two million additional voters, making it the 
most successful party in the central and eastern Java region.
115
 Anti-Western sentiments were 
also on the rise due to the failed Indonesian attempt to have the issue of West Irian tabled for 
discussion at the UN General Assembly. This failure provoked nationalist across the political 
spectrum to seek a more militant line in forcing the Dutch to relinquish control.  At the 333rd 
meeting of the National Security Council on the 1 August the President offered his starkest 
appraisal yet of the situation in Indonesia.  The Undersecretary of State Christian Herter – 
Dulles deputy in the State Department-  commented that he “was disturbed by the 
developments in Indonesia…[and that] it appeared to him that a democratic government in 
that country was out the window..” Admiral Radford, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, noted that “ [the establishment of ]a Communist government would be militarily 
harmful, since Indonesia is astride the routes of communication in  Southeast Asia and has a 
great many potential Communist submarine bases.” The President stated “the best course 
would be to hold all Indonesia in the Free World. The next best course would be to hold 
Sumatra if Java goes Communist.”116 
The need for action was made concrete by the formation of an Indonesian study group 
comprised of officials from both the Department of State and Defence to survey the situation 
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in Indonesia.  The group was chaired by former Ambassador to Indonesia Hugh S. 
Cummings. In a memorandum sent the next day to Ambassador Allison in Jakarta, Assistant 
Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Walter S. Robertson encapsulated the need for 
dynamism in dealing with the situation in Indonesia. Robertson spoke of a “snowballing 
Communist trend” and that the “Communist infiltration of Indonesia Govt and society bears 
unpleasant similarities to situation which pertained in Guatemala under Arbenz.” A rather 
interesting analogy when one considers the similarities between the operations conducted in 
both countries.
117
  
The “Special Report on Indonesia” prepared by the Ad-Hoc interdepartmental Committee 
provided the official green light for the use of covert operations to support regional dissidents 
on Sumatra and Suluwesi and prevent Indonesia falling into Communist hands. The report 
was a clarion call for tough action in Indonesia. It stated   “the most important implication of 
a Communist takeover on Java would be psychological and political. The general position of 
non-Communists in Asia would be weakened as the non-Communist states of Southeast Asia 
would feel themselves squeezed between Communist China and Communist Vietnam (the 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam) on the north, and Communist Java on the south.”118 The 
report offered three potential policy approaches; to continue with present policy towards 
Indonesia in the hope that Communist gains would arouse and unify non and anti-Communist 
counter forces, to terminate aid programs in the hope that such actions would shock anti-
Communist forces into action and finally covert operations.
119
  
The covert approach would be cloaked in the continued formal diplomatic relationship 
between Washington and Jakarta. However, the report recommended that the United States 
“…adjust our programs (aid) and activities as to give greater emphasis to support of the anti –
Communist forces in the outer-islands while at the same time continuing attempts to produce 
effective action on the part of the non and anti-Communist forces in Java.” This policy track 
was viewed by the committee and the National Security Council as having “…the most 
promising approach at this stage for the United States… in exploiting the not inconsiderable 
potential political resources and economic leverage available in the outer islands, particularly 
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in Sumatra and Sulawesi (Celebes)…”120 Leading into 1958, this policy approach would 
become the primary instrument for dealing with Indonesia. The covert arm of the policy 
conducted through the CIA would become known as “Operation Haik”.  
 
The decision to support the regional rebellions by the Eisenhower Administration obscures an 
ongoing struggle behind closed doors for control of Indonesian policy. This battle would pit 
Ambassador to Indonesia John Allison against the formidable combination of the Dulles 
brothers. John Allison who replaced Hugh Cummings in February 1957, sought to build a 
dynamic personal relationship with President Sukarno and senior leaders in Jakarta. Allison- 
with his portly figure that was widely mocked by leftist and PKI newspapers- was an 
experienced diplomat who had previously served as ambassador in Japan. His experience 
dealing with the turbulence of post-WW2 Asia gave him a unique insight into the nature of 
Indonesian politics. His dynamism in trying to bring about a new era of bilateral U.S.- 
Indonesian relations ruffled feathers across the Pacific, particularly in the office of the 
Secretary of State. Allison questioned the alarmist attitudes that many officials (including the 
Secretary of State) expressed towards Sukarno’s initiative of Guided Democracy. He also 
sought to bridge the suspicions that had developed between the two countries by 
recommending the United States support mediations on the issue of West Irian in the United 
Nations.
121
  
Allison initially expressed his uncertainty towards Sukarno’s konsepi, describing it as a 
system that “could take either form of communism or a Hitlerian national socialism.” He also 
saw it as a cynical power grab by the “Bung Karno” and a blow to the United States in 
supporting “our system of democracy.”122 However, his meetings with senior Indonesian 
politicians tempered Allison’s scepticism. In his discussions with Prime Minister Djuanda on 
the 20 August, Allison came away feeling that Guided Democracy was not so much a step 
towards Communism, but a groping effort to find the best form of governance for the 
Indonesian people.
123
 On this thorny issue of West Irian, an issue the Eisenhower 
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Administration wished would disappear beneath the Arafura Sea, Allison proposed a bold 
initiative.  
In a cable to Secretary Dulles on the 26 August 1957, he outlined the difficulty of improving 
ties with Indonesia while there was no progress on West Irian. “Sukarno and Indonesians 
have no (repeat no) direct experience of Soviet Colonialism – but West Irian is nearby; it 
should be theirs and by our non-support or neutrality we only prove that in fact we are still on 
[the] side of colonialists. So runs Sukarno’s thinking.124” Allison suggested that the United 
States cast off its neutrality in the dispute and work with Indonesia, Australia and the Dutch 
to craft a solution which respected the interests of all parties. He believed that a negotiated 
solution would appease Indonesian nationalism, ease tensions between the Dutch and the 
Indonesians and weaken the appeal of the PKI. These negotiations would eventually grant 
Indonesia sovereignty over West New Guinea. However, the process would be conducted 
jointing with the Dutch, and the use of force would be renounced. In return for gaining 
control over WNG, the Indonesian government and President Sukarno would act to curb 
Communist influence within the country. In acting to undermine the PKI and its associates, 
Indonesia would receive substantial economic and military aid, particularly aimed at solving 
regional problems.  
The novelty of Allison’s approach was ignored in Washington. For Secretary of State Dulles 
and President Eisenhower, Sukarno was already tainted by his policy of  Guided Democracy 
and his flirting with the PKI. Allison had already become isolated from the key policy-
makers in Washington and his diplomatic role subverted by the CIA. For men such as Dulles 
and Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Robertson, both vehement anti-
communists who had made careers attacking the Truman Administration for losing China, a 
perceived Communist gain in Indonesia was unthinkable. Walter Robertson, a figure who has 
largely disappeared from history, seethed over the American failure to prevent the defeat of 
Chiang Kai-shek in the Chinese Civil War. This urbane Virginian gentleman saw any 
Communist gains in Asia as potentially disastrous.
125
  With mid-term elections approaching 
and Presidential elections on the horizon, Democrats wished to put President Eisenhower’s 
legacy in foreign affairs to the test. For the Administration, any Communist gain had to be 
thwarted. Senate Minority Leader Lyndon B. Johnson called Sputnik “a 
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disaster…comparable to Pearl Harbour,” while other Democrats in Congress hoped to use 
Sputnik to attack the national security credentials of the Administration in the mid-term 
elections.
126
 Throughout late 1957, the psychological shock of Sputnik reverberating through 
Washington and the Soviet Union looked increasingly assertive in the Third World. In a NSC 
meeting, Dulles saw Sputnik as part of a broader Soviet campaign to demonstrate the 
superiority of the Soviet model of development in the Third World.
127
  If no decisive action 
were taken to bring Sukarno to heel and thwart the PKI, the Eisenhower Administration 
would look weak at home and abroad.  
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Chapter Three 
 
 
The Australian Government Response to the Outer-Island Rebellion 
On the 15 February 1958, Lieutenant Colonel Ahmad Husein, announced on Radio 
Bukittinggi the formation of the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia 
(PRRI). Colonel Husein, known as the “Tiger of Kuranji” had been one of the first regional 
military leaders to overtly rebel against the policies of President Sukarno and his cabinet.
128
 
The PRRI declaration emphasized the granting of increased political powers to the regions, 
reform of the military leadership (particularly the army), and that a new cabinet be formed 
that undermined the newly vested powers of President Sukarno and the PKI. The declaration 
of the PRRI, the military and intelligence assistance provided to the rebels by the C.I.A 
through Operation Haik and the resort to military force by the central government would have 
profound impact on how Australian politicians and foreign policy makers viewed the political 
turmoil in the region, and were thus cause for suspicion and concern. 
 
The actions of the regional rebels provoked a mixed reaction from leading politicians, 
diplomats and the wider public in Australia. It was viewed by some as a quixotic struggle; 
pitting brave anti-communist rebels against a regime closely aligned with the Indonesian 
Communist Party (PKI), and intent on promoting policies inimical to the Australian national 
interest. For other politicians and diplomats, the rebels remained an unknown quantity. This 
chapter will explore how the Australian government dealt with an outbreak of major regional 
unrest in a country that was essential to Australia’s defence and national security. Initially, 
the chapter will examine the response of key figures within the Menzies Cabinet and figures 
within the Department of External Affairs to the unfolding events on Sumatra, Suluwesi, and 
in Jakarta, events that were distorted by poor communication, lack of factual evidence and 
ignorance of the dynamics on the ground. As military operations changed the dynamics of the 
revolt - the rapid collapse of organised rebel resistance and the use of unknown aircraft by 
third party actors to assist rebel forces- Australian diplomats and politicians worked 
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frantically to preserve long-term interests. As the situation worsened, Australian diplomats 
worked assiduously to prevent the intervention of hostile third parties (i.e. the USSR or PRC) 
and cultivated support for a détente with moderate leaders in Jakarta, particular Army Chief 
of Staff Abdul Haris Nasution. Australia politicians and diplomats were also active in 
providing support for the State Department in its attempts to move Indonesia policy away 
from the Central Intelligence Agency.  
  
 
Australia’s Response to the Rebellion in a Cold War context 
The emerging threat of Communist China combined with the efforts of both the PRC and 
USSR to support Communist political organisations, particularly in Southeast Asia. 
Communist Parties had been active throughout the region since the 1920s. However, the post-
WWII conditions in the region allowed these parties the flourish from Burma in the west to 
the Philippines in the east. Although, according to historian Ilya V.Gaiduk, Stalin remained 
skeptical about the success of armed Communist uprisings in the region. In October 1950, in 
a letter to representatives of the Indonesia Communist party (PKI), the “Vozhd” cautioned his 
Indonesian comrades about using the Chinese Revolution as an example. Aware of the limits 
of Soviet power and more concerned with European affairs, he called for gradual agrarian 
reform rather than armed revolt.
129
 Australian policy-makers on the other hand saw the rise of 
indigenous Communist parties as part of a Moscow centered effort to undermine Western 
interests in the region.
130
 In Indonesia, the expanding prestige and power of the PKI and its 
appeals to “expansionist” Indonesian nationalism on the question of West New Guinea was a 
threat that Australia took seriously.  
The menace of the PKI combined with Australia’s long-term strategic stake in ensuring 
cordial relations were maintained between Australia and Indonesia. Indonesia’s primacy in 
Australia’s foreign policy was indisputable. Due its population, economic potential, and 
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strategic location on crucial lanes of sea and air communication it was a source of both  
fascination and fear. During the dark days and months of 1941-42 as the Imperial Japanese 
army and navy pushed southwards towards Australia, it was only through the Indonesia 
archipelago or using it as a base that Australia could be effectively attacked or isolated from 
its great and powerful friends.
131
  
During the mid to late 1950s, the political and economic volatility of the Indonesian Republic 
was seen to have created the conditions for the rising influence of the PKI in Indonesian 
domestic politics and the growing influence of the Soviet Union and the PRC. Both the USSR 
and PRC had by the mid-1950s adopted increasingly cordial policies in relation to Indonesia 
and broadly towards nativist nationalist regimes such as Sukarno’s. The emergence of Nikita 
Khrushchev as the main actor in the crafting of Soviet foreign policy signaled a move away 
from the brinkmanship of Stalin and more concern with the so called Third World.  
Khrushchev felt that Stalin’s caution in the Third World and reluctance to engage with 
bourgeois nationalists- such as Sukarno- alienated potential allies in the newly decolonized 
world.
132
 
 In his speech at the 20
th
 Congress of Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), 
Khrushchev not only denounced the crimes of Stalin’s reign of terror, but announced a new 
Soviet foreign policy towards the Third world.
133
 “The new period that Lenin predicted in 
world history when the peoples of the East take an active part… in international relations has 
arrived…though not part of the socialist system, [they] can benefit from its achievements. 
They now have no need to go begging to their former oppressors for modern equipment. 
They can obtain such equipment in the socialist countries.”134 Through programs of trade 
negotiations, interest-free loans, infrastructure projects, and military aid, the Soviet Union 
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sought to enhance its role in the newly decolonized world and undermine the global 
pretensions of United States.
135
  
 
The People’s Republic of China also moved along the path of conciliation. During the 
Geneva Conference in May 1954, the PRC moved away from its “rogue state” image by 
working effectively with Western powers-although not the United States- in resolving the 
Franco-Vietnamese War.
136
 In 1955, the PRC accepted an invitation to attend the Bandung 
Conference hosted by President Sukarno. Here Zhou En-lai, Chairman Mao’s chief diplomat 
astutely cultivated the friendship and trust of several Third World leaders (including 
President Sukarno). Instead of being the mouthpiece of dogmatic Communist ideology, 
Zhou’s charm and charisma as well as his enunciation of peaceful co-existence in the Asia-
Pacific made a direct impact.
137
 In his main speech at the conferences plenary session, Zhou 
emphasized commonalities that united those nations in attendance by stating that“May 
independent countries have appeared since World War II. One group consists of countries led 
by Communist Parties and the other of countries led by nationalists…Both of these groups 
have freed themselves from colonial rule…Is there any reason why we cannot understand and 
respect each other and give each other support and sympathy?”138 Chen Jian, the doyen of 
Maoist China’s diplomatic history notes that Geneva and Bandung marked China’s 
emergence as a revolutionary power committed to the struggles of those oppressed in the 
non-Western world (including Indonesia) and the formation of a “united front” with these 
groups.
139
 
 
The emboldened PKI and the rising influence of the Communist powers in Indonesia was 
duly noted by Australian officials. In a memorandum of conversation between American 
officials and Secretary of the Department of External Affairs Arthur Tange, the mercurial 
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secretary offered his assessment of the changes in Soviet foreign policy, particularly in 
relation to Southeast Asia. Tange did not view the changes that had taken place under 
Khrushchev as changing the fundamental objectives of Soviet foreign policy, “the ultimate 
socialization of the world”. However, instead of using the threat of force or force via proxy, 
the Soviet Union would “increase Soviet influence in the rest of the world by a policy based 
ostensibly upon competitive co-existence and more moderate or at least less militarily 
aggressive means than heretofore.” In relation to Australia’s near north, Tange believed that 
Soviet aid and trade programs could not be ignored by Western nations. “He (Tange) 
believed that it would necessitate the rethinking of present Western programs of this nature 
and a possible reorientation in their application towards the underdeveloped countries.”140  
The growing political instability in Indonesia during mid to late 1957 provoked deep concern 
with the Australia political establishment. The growing power of the PKI, the advent of 
Guided Democracy and the growing interest of the Soviet Union and People’s Republic of 
China in Indonesian affairs painted an ominous picture according to the Australian 
government; Britain and the United States shared these fears. In a “Top Secret” Joint 
Intelligence Committee report released on the 27 November 1957, senior military intelligence 
officers from the three branches of the defence force as well as members of External Affairs 
saw the Indonesian archipelago seething with turmoil. While the report stipulated that “…it is 
unlikely the whole of Indonesia will fall under Communist control by the end of 1960” the 
growing power and influence of the P.K.I was of deep concern. In particular, the efforts of 
the PKI to join in “united front” political activities “it (PKI) has since (1955) followed a 
consistent policy of exploiting the “united front” tactic and supporting the authority of the 
unitary government. The PKI has been greatly assisted during the past year by the ideas 
contained in Sukarno’s political concept (guided democracy) and by Sukarno himself, who 
has, on numerous occasions, championed PKI interests directly.” The report predicted that by 
1960 the PKI would increase its electoral advantage, with Java emerging with the largest 
communist representation.
141
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Australia and West New Guinea 
The election of the Liberal-Country Party Coalition under the leadership of Robert Menzies 
in 1949 did not radically alter the Australian approach to Indonesia. As opposition leader, 
Menzies had criticized the activist policies of his Labor predecessors in support of the 
Indonesian Republicans as a betrayal of a “white ally”.142 However, on assuming office, 
Menzies aimed to establish cordial relations with the Indonesian Republic due to its 
importance to Australian national security. This developing partnership encountered one 
major obstacle, which would blight bilateral relations throughout the 1950s, the political 
status of West New Guinea. 
 On the 29 August 1950, Percy Spender enunciated in a statement at the Hague Australia’s 
desire to prevent Indonesia from gaining control of the territory. Spender saw Dutch retention 
as a geographic issue, “the whole of New Guniea, including Dutch New Guinea [he claimed], 
is not in any way geographically part of Indonesia”. He also pointed out that the Indonesians 
shared no racial affinity with the inhabitants of Dutch New Guinea, “[T]the people of Dutch 
New Guinea are the same people as inhabit Australian New Guinea and Australian Papua” 
and therefore made up “one race” of people. Spender believed that since the Papuans had not 
reached a sufficient stage of “political consciousness and maturity” West Papua should 
remain under Dutch tutelage to ensure that the inhabitants had a say in future self-
determination. Finally, Spender saw Dutch New Guinea as vital to the Australian national 
interest in both strategic and military terms. The experience of the Japanese threat of 1941-42 
and uncertainty over Indonesian irredentism had “shown to Australians how strategically 
vital to Australian defence is the mainland of New Guinea. I (Spender) have pointed out 
before that we cannot alter our geography which for all time makes this idea of supreme 
consequence to Australia.
143”  
 
 These concerns clashed directly with Indonesia sensitivity to sovereignty, fears of neo-
colonialism and Indonesian nationalism. “The essence of the Indonesian case is that 
Indonesia is the successor state to the Netherland East Indies (N.E.I) and as such has a full 
right to all former N.E.I territory. The facts about the degree of racial affinity, the Dutch legal 
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position etc, do not interest or impress the Indonesians”.144 For Indonesian nationalists of all 
political stripes the Dutch retention of West Irian was a deeply emotional issue with the 
potential to cause a serious breech in Australia-Indonesia relations. Ambassador Crocker 
noted that “Dutch New Guinea was used by the Dutch for years as the place of imprisonment 
for Indonesian nationalist leaders” and that “for men of this kind Irian has something of the 
emotional connotation which “the Bastille” had for leaders of the French Revolution.”145 
Irian therefore became a place crucial to the forging of the Indonesian nationalist myth. 
Where its leaders endured depravations in Dutch concentration camps but emerged still 
vociferous in their desire for independence. Besides emotional connections, the issue of West 
Irian held immense political advantage.  
 
 Beginning with President Sukarno, the issue of West New Guinea became a lightning rod for 
Indonesian seeking to burnish their nationalist credentials with the electorate. Sukarno’s 
interest in West New Guinea was frivolously described by Ambassador Crocker “ he 
(Sukarno) …applies such character as he commands and such energy as he has left over from 
his several wives and concubine to the New Guinea issue more than any other single 
issue.”146 During an Indonesian goodwill mission to Australia in October 1955, which was 
led by Dr Roem of the moderate Masjumi Party, Acting External Affairs Minister McBride 
devotes a substantial proportion of a memorandum to the Prime Minister seeking ways of 
drawing discussion away from West New Guinea. An issue where “there is at present too 
much emotion on this issue in all countries concerned for any generally acceptable 
solution…the only solution in these circumstances is to put the matter into cold storage for 
the present.” 147 
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 Throughout the early to mid-1950s, Australian politicians and diplomats had aimed at 
keeping the issue of West New Guinea in “cold storage” while concentrating on developing 
Columbo Plan assistance to Indonesia, forming greater trading relations and discussing the 
menace posed by “communist imperialism”. In a cable from New York, Percy Spender, now 
Australian ambassador in Washington, outlined the primacy of West New Guinea in shaping 
Australian regional engagement. “All other considerations (e.g friendly relations with 
Indonesia and the rest of Asia), though relevant and however important, are secondary [to 
Dutch New Guinea].” Spender went on to note that “…our interest in West New Guinea is , 
as I see it, indefinite in point of time, whilst the stability of Indonesia in friendly hand for a 
co-terminus period is at least most problematical (sic).”148   
 
However, the process of decolonisation and emerging third-word solidarity movements made 
this increasingly difficult. The Asian-African conference of third world leaders held in 
Bandung condemned Dutch retention of New Guinea. Crocker noted the leaders at Bandung 
saw “…the Dutch retention is a manifestation of European imperialism and therefore bad, 
irrespective of Indonesia’s intentions or her capacity to run West New Guinea justly and 
efficiently…They want to see every vestige of colonialism rooted out.149” This emboldened 
Indonesia to use the United Nations as a way of bringing about substantive discussions on the 
future status of the territory. This more assertive diplomatic approach combined with a 
growing domestic chorus for action in returning West Irian to the fold of the motherland. 
Australian diplomats in Indonesia noted the emergence of pseudo para-military groups 
committed to ending the last vestige of Dutch rule. The B.P.I.B ( Badan Perdjuangan Irian 
Bharat- Organisation for the Liberation of West Irian) and the Revolutionary People’s Front 
to liberate West Irian, while attracting a limited amount of armed volunteers intent on 
conducting operations against the Dutch, were symptomatic of the growing salience of the 
West New Guinea issue. Dismissive of the military potential of these organisations, 
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Ambassador Crocker still noted that “[T]hey form a nucleus which in case of need might be 
developed into something effective.”150 
 
By late 1957 the issue of West New Guinea would cease to be one of “cold storage” but an 
“explosive question” that ruptured Australian-Indonesian relations, and had a direct 
correlation to how Australia dealt with the Outer-island rebellion. Indonesia had sort to use 
the United Nations as a way to coerce the Dutch government to grant Indonesia sovereign 
control of West New Guinea. Unluckily for them, this diplomatic road had proven to be 
fruitless. Four times the United Nations had declined to accept the validity of the Indonesia 
claim for U.N intervention, due to the lack of the required majority-two thirds of the General 
Assembly.  
 
This diplomatic logjam provoked a unilateral response from the Indonesian government that 
was firmly supported by President Sukarno. Beginning on the 30 November, the day after the 
unsuccessful vote, President Sukarno, seeing the vote as a national and personal humiliation 
encouraged trade unions and the Indonesia army to seize Dutch assets and ordered the 
expulsion of the remaining Dutch citizens living in Indonesia (around 46,000 people). For 
many Western leaders this unilateral action brought back uncomfortable memories of 
Nassar’s nationalization of the Suez Canal in 1956. Workers and soldiers seized control of 
the Koninklijk Paketvaart Maatschappij (K.P.M), the main inter-island shipping line, Dutch 
companies and business, circulation of Dutch-language publications was prohibited, the 
Netherlands diplomatic mission was ordered to cease all activity and Dutch nationals found 
themselves harassed in the streets, unable to attend theatres or restaurants and without water 
and gas for their homes.
151
  
When viewed from Canberra, the situation evolving across the archipelago was extremely 
alarming for diplomats and foreign policy officials. Australian diplomats feared for safety of 
Australian citizens in Indonesia. In particular, External Affairs Minister Casey worried that 
the Indonesian government-which was already fragile- might lose control of the situation. 
The passing of Indonesia into “lawlessness” was seen as a way for the PKI to maximize its 
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power and visibility. Casey feared that “the passing of Indonesia into lawless Communist 
control [risked] substantial intervention by Russia or Communist China.
152” In a carefully 
worded statement to parliament that made headlines throughout the major capitals, Casey 
rebuked Indonesia for striking “a grievous blow” to “the concept of international order which 
the United Nations was established to defend.
153” While condemning the actions of the 
Indonesian government, Casey continued to express to reiterate Australia’s desire for friendly 
relations with our nearest neighbour “with whom we have lived on terms of amity and with 
whom we only have had only one major point of disagreement.
154” However, this “one major 
problem” had produced a major void in Australian-Indonesian relations that expressions of 
friendship were incapable of filling.  
In a direct appeal to the Australian people, Indonesian Foreign Minister Dr Subandrio evoked 
memories of Australia’s not so distant past to reflect on the harm the West New Guinea 
dispute was doing to friendly relations. In a direct reference to the collapse of Dutch 
resistance in the East Indies during early 1942, Subandrio stated “…it is not a West New 
Guinea still in Dutch colonial hands which will guarantee Australia’s security but rather the 
whole of Indonesia forms the first defence line for Australia, as was proved, in the Second 
World War.
155” 
 
 In the United States, the anti-Dutch campaign added further impetus to the planning and 
logistics for Operation Haik. Allen Dulles indicted to President Eisenhower that “The 
Communist-dominated labor union, SOBSI, has continued to take over Dutch enterprises, 
which course of action was given an air of legality by the government appointed Indonesian 
officials to supervise these enterprises.” Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, 
Walter Robertson was even more fatalistic, declaring “we have reached the point of no return 
with Sukarno…Our best opportunities lie with the Masjumi leaders, the right-wing elements 
of Indo Nat Party (PNI), the opposition groups and the anti-Communist elements in the 
military and minor parties.”156 In a meeting prior to Secretary Dulles departure to Paris for a 
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NATO conference Ambassador Spender requested the United States intervene with direct 
talks with the Indonesian government and argued that Indonesian actions were nothing less 
than “international blackmail” something which the United States could not ignore.  
 
“Going off half-cocked” Australian co-operation in Operation Haik 
By early 1958, the Australian Government was co-operating with its counterparts in London 
and Washington to ensure that Indonesia did not become a Communist sphere of influence. 
This co-operation involved the highest levels of Australian government supporting efforts by 
the United States, and to a lesser extent the United Kingdom to build up the regional 
dissenters on Sumatra and Suluwesi as an anti-Communist counter-weight to the “tainted” 
central government in Java. Due to the sensitivity of Australia interfering in Indonesian 
domestic affairs, the nature of this support (ie materials etc) remains hidden from the public. 
However, from the declassified information available it is clear that Australia supported and 
co-operated in Operation Haik. The end of 1957 had provided a justification for Australian 
policy-makers to support its allies in the endeavor. President Sukarno was seen to be in direct 
alliance with the increasingly powerful PKI, Indonesia was seen to be taking a harder line 
towards Dutch New Guinea-with even some Dutch newspapers and politicians talking of war 
and the Soviet Union and to a lesser extent Communist China were taking a more assertive  
stance towards Indonesia.  
On the 12 December 1957, British Prime Minister Harold Macmillian wrote to Prime 
Minister Menzies expressing his view that the Indonesia situation “looks very bad and 
menacing” for both Australia and Britain157. Macmillian promised to raise the issue of 
Indonesia with Eisenhower and Dulles at the NATO Heads of Government meeting in Paris 
on 16 December. The letter also reveals Macmillian’s commitment to what David Reynolds 
describes as “global containment” stating “I have always felt that is it not sufficient to trust to 
N.A.T.O to guard the European front if we leave the Middle East and Far East open.”  This 
opinion reflected both Eisenhower and Macmillian’s view that the special relationship had “a 
common interest in preventing violent, sudden change in Asia and the Middle East, which 
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might threaten their economic interests and the general distribution of power.
158” According 
to Matthew Jones, between the 16 and 19 of December the framework for U.K-U.S joint 
covert operations was put in place.
159
 Macmillian again wrote to Menzies on the 20 
December, outlining to him the results of the deliberations in Paris.  The urgency of the 
situation is palpable in this top-secret letter. The British P.M stated “…there may well be a 
very real danger of a Communist dominated regime taking over in Java before very long if 
events follow their present course unchecked.” In this context, the Communist “infection” has 
to be prevented from “…spreading to the other islands by helping strengthen the anti-
Communist forces which are in the ascendant in the outer islands…” This course of action 
came with many risks particularly its potential to jeopardise relations with Asian members of 
the Commonwealth, be perceived as Western nations “ganging up” against a Asian member 
of the UN and the appearance of interfering in the affairs of a sovereign country. Even with 
these risks Macmillian starkly pronounced that “the Indonesian situation seems to us to be 
developing in such a way that despite our efforts Java may not be lost and if that happens 
action on these lines would, we hope, enable us to save the outer islands from the wreck.
160”  
 
As the New Year dawned, the crescendo of covert operations within and discussions of 
Indonesia continued unabated. On the evening of the 2 January, senior State and CIA officials 
met in the Secretary of State’s office in Washington to debate the future of U.S. policy 
towards Indonesia. The meeting included the key supporters of covert assistance to the 
regional rebels, Dulles, Robertson and Cummings from State and Allen Dulles, Frank Wisner 
and Al Ulmer from the CIA. The meeting resounding endorsed the “Report of the Special 
Committee on Indonesia” and agreed to move forward with the covert operations. Secretary 
Dulles expressed the view that “[W]e should not make any deals with Sukarno or the present 
government [and] we should build up a position of strength in the outer islands and should be 
ready with assistance we might want to render at a later date on short notice.” Robertson 
reported on the proceedings of U.S-U.K working group that established following the NATO 
conference in December. These meetings had “generally reflected a similarity of views as 
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between the US and the UK” on the situation in Indonesia and support for the outer islands. 
While expressing solidarity in supporting the outer islands, the issue of West New Guinea 
remained a subject of contention. Following the seizure of Dutch property and the expulsion 
of Dutch citizens, the United States sympathized with The Netherlands government, however 
as Gordon Mein, director of the Office of Southwest Pacific affairs noted “no government 
coming into power in Indonesia could avoid the Dutch-Indonesian problem with now is wider 
that just West Irian.”161 
On the other side of the Pacific, the Australian government was moving into lockstep with its 
American and British allies. Replying to Macmillians letter of the 20 December, Menzies 
outlined his government’s attitude to the regional rebellion.  
“Our assessment of the present situation in Indonesia accords very largely with your own. We 
believe that the position has now been reached in Indonesia where there is now a danger that 
a Communist-dominated government might achieve power. The situation also contains the 
possibility of civil war, economic disruption and national disintegration. While these 
developments are no means inevitable, the present weak and inept national leadership appears 
to be able to do little to avert them.” 
While Menzies shies away from endorsing the break-up of Indonesia, stating that “we would 
want to contemplate the breakaway of the provinces from Java only at the point where we 
had to abandon hope of these provinces preventing the Djakarta government going 
Communist.” The letter supports the conclusions made in Washington and London that “we 
should be prepared to examine ways of strengthening and encouraging provincial leaders to 
exercise influence in Djakarta.
162” However, Menzies still holds out hope that “moderate 
leaders” could also be encouraged on Java. Like Eisenhower and Dulles in Washington and 
Macmillan and Lloyd in London, Menzies emphasized the “covert” nature of any assistance. 
This assistance, the Prime Minister suggested should utilize Singapore as a hub for 
communication, technical assistance and trade with the rebels on Sumatra. The Sumatran 
leaders should be facilitated with contact with Malayan leaders through British intermediaries 
to discuss furthering relations. Menzies emphatically agrees with Macmillian that the risks of 
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this sort of undertaking are high, especially in relation to the broader region, however the 
“utmost care and discretion in our dealing” will alleviate any risk.163  
 
The momentum of joint U.S-U.K-Australian covert operations had a direct impact on the 
situation on the ground, particularly in Sumatra. The rebellious colonels and their supporters 
were, as the New Year dawned, receiving substantial amounts of funding and arms through 
the CIA. Using CAT aircraft flying from Taiwan, Thailand and the Philippines, large 
amounts of modern American-made small-arms, tons of ammunition, machine guns, anti-tank 
and anti-aircraft weapons were now in rebel hands, while secretive deliveries of supplies via 
U.S. Navy submarines or barges provided for heavier weapons.
164
 Using CIA agents based in 
Singapore, rebel agents acquired furthering funding, supplementing the revenue already 
gained from the smuggling of raw materials. The CIA also provided for some rebel officers 
and NCO’s to be smuggled from Sumatra to Singapore, then taken for advanced jungle 
warfare training and radio communications as far away as Guam or the U.S. Marine base at 
Okinawa, Japan.
165
 Besides covert support, elements of the U.S Seventh fleet deployed to 
within 500 miles of Sumatra. These ships were tasked with intervening if there was an overt 
threat to U.S. civilians or property on Sumatra (particularly American-owned oil fields). 
Accompanying the capital ships were elements of the 3
rd
 Marine division aboard amphibious 
assault ships, with twenty helicopters to provided for air mobility.
166
  
The rebel colonels emboldened by increased military support and the potential of de facto 
American recognition as an alternative government to Jakarta were now less intent to secure a 
solution via compromise. Since the beginning of the rebellion, efforts had been made my 
moderate politicians in Djakatra to defuse the situation on Sumatra and in Suluwesi. 
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Conferences such as the Munas conference, held in September 1957 hoped to bridge the gap 
between Djarkarta and the rebel colonels on issues related to economic reform, trade 
restrictions, representation for the outer-islands and military reform. However, by early 1958, 
the spirit of compromise was fading fast. The departure of President Sukarno on a month-
long world-wide tour, gave the rebels hope that they could force the central governments 
hand. Sukarno had left ostensibly to lobby the Indonesian case for West New Guinea but also 
to recover from the aftermath of the ‘Cikini’ assassination attempt against him on the 30 
November which killed eleven- mainly schoolchildren- and wounded thirty. The grenade 
attack was orchestrated by former army intelligence chief Colonel Zulkifi Lubis who opposed 
the military reforms of General Nasution. Following the attack Lubis was granted sanctuary 
by Colonel Husein in Western Sumatra. Rebel commanders feared that if they did not move 
before Sukarno returned, “the dalang” would outmaneuver them politically. They knew all 
too well what a cunning political operator Sukarno could be and hoped that action before he 
returned would give them a stronger hand in pushing their demands.
167
  
 
 
On 10  February, the regional rebels from Sumatra and Suluwesi issued an ultimatum of 
political demands to the central government. The charter issued by Colonel Husein, 
demanded that Sukarno resume his constitutional position and revoke the move towards 
Guided Democracy that was considered a fig-leaf for the expansion of the PKI’s power base. 
The regional dissenters called upon the current government of Prime Minister Djuanda to 
return its political mandate and for Hatta and the Sultan of Yogyakarta to form a caretaker 
cabinet until new general elections could be held. The issuing of the Permesta ultimatum on 
the 10 February and its passing without regard by the central government in Jakarta five days 
later, marked the beginning of armed conflict and civil war. The rebels rejected outright 
attempts to seek a compromise agreement (such as the Munas conference) since they believed 
Sukarno had sabotaged all previous talks. 
 In private talks held on the morning of the 4 February with the acting U.S. Ambassador in 
Jakarta (Cottrell), Foreign Minister Subandrio highlighted the number one concern of figures 
with the central government. The question of keeping Indonesia unified. While Subandrio 
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freely admitted that Sukarno and Hatta “were poles apart” on the question on the participation 
of Communists within the government, he believed the threat was exaggerated. He 
commented that “I know they (the  Communists) are dangerous but we have our eyes on them 
and can certainly control them.” The main danger was that Indonesia was “going through a 
very difficult period in our effort to maintain a unified country…”168  
 
The passing of the five-day ultimatum on the 15 February and announcement of the 
formation of the Pemerintah Revousioner Republik Indonesia (PRRI), the Revolutionary 
Government of the Republic of Indonesia created a political situation both the regional rebels 
and the central government found difficult to retreat from. By declaring a counter-
government opposed to the policies of Jakarta, which sought sovereign over the whole 
archipelago as well as national and international recognition the rebels had painted 
themselves into a corner of their own making. Emboldened by foreign covert aid and the 
righteousness of their cause the rebels had brought about a direct confrontation with Jakarta 
that months of negotiations had sought to avoid.
169
 For the central government, the formation 
of the PRRI was a direct challenge to its sovereignty and an existential threat to the survival 
of a unitary Indonesian state. From now on any hope of compromise was dead.  
The formation of a counter-government brought back black memories of Dutch attempts at 
undermining the Indonesian Republic through the formation of a separate Indonesian state 
allied to the Dutch in Eastern Indonesian during the War of Independence. With the survival 
of the Republic at stake, the rebels needed to be crushed militarily. Prime Minister Djuanda, 
Chief of the General Staff Nasution and President Sukarno, newly returned to Indonesia from 
abroad saw military action as the only way to resolve the situation. For General Nasution, this 
was a task he relished. Since becoming Chief of the General Staff, the regional rebels had 
been a hindrance to his attempts at modernizing and streamlining the Indonesian Army. For 
President Sukarno the choice was even starker, he could either acquiesce in the rebels 
demands, and remove himself from office, or rally his supporters and defeat this challenge. 
What had started as a dispute over the demands of a disparate group of military officers had 
now become a showdown over the nature of the Indonesian state.    
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With the rejection of the Rebels political ultimatum on 15 February, a military solution 
seemed the only viable way to resolve the crisis. The stakes for both sides were high, Dr D. 
Sumitro, formerly Minister of Finance in the Djuanda cabinet now rebel minister for 
Commerce and Shipping spoke exclusively to the Singapore Free Press newspaper on the 
goals and obligations of the dissenters. Sumitro spoke of his fellow leaders and friends in the 
“national front” having a “sense of responsibly for the fate of our people and for the future of 
our nation.” In forming a counter-government in direct opposition to President Sukarno, 
Sumitro cast his fellow rebels as defenders of the Indonesia Revolution that had been 
circumvented by “Sukarno’s whims and tactics and what the Communists were doing along 
with him…we saw our people becoming victims. This we had to prevent.” In a rhetorical 
tipping of the hat to the foreign backers of the rebellion, Sumitro stated “The consolidation 
and victory of my government against the destructive forces in our country would also serve 
the cause of international peace and stability in the whole region and in the world at large.”170 
 Vernon Bartlett, writing for The Straits Times of Singapore notes that the crisis would decide 
the future of Indonesian national unity as well as President Sukarno “[H]istory would accuse 
the President of destroying national unity, not the colonels…” Bartlett feared that the ongoing 
crisis would turn Indonesia into “another Korea, a battlefield in a ideological war…” While 
noting the substantial grievances that the regional dissenters have with the Central 
Government, Bartlett believed that “…national unity has not yet been irrevocably destroyed. 
But only one man could restore it…Dr Soekarno.”171 The determination of the Central 
Government to restore national unity had been revealed the day before when Indonesian Air 
Force Mustang fighters attacked Radio stations used by the rebels in Padang and Bukittinggi. 
The transmitters which were used to broadcast by the rebel government were temporarily put 
off air, although with the loss of two Mustangs and their crews- the first of many casualties in 
the Outer-Island rebellion.
172
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Australia, Britain and the United States viewed the adoption of military means by President 
Sukarno and the Central Government as a product of increased Communist influence over the 
Indonesian polity. Communist newspapers throughout Java had been quick to damn the rebel 
ultimatum and saw the rebels as the tools of SEATO, the Dutch and American oil interests. In 
a Top Secret and Personal Memorandum to Prime Minister Menzies from Selwyn Lloyd 
presenting his government attitude to events on the ground, it stipulated that “Sukarno seems 
intent on pursuing a policy closely allied with that of the Indonesian Communist Party (P.K.I) 
namely of intensifying the  present fighting. This may lead to overthrow of dissidents or 
prolonged civil war.” The PKI according to Lloyd regarded the “present crisis as crucial to 
their own future and are convinced that if the Central government can crush the dissidents by 
ruthless action they will ultimately come out on top.” In these circumstances, Lloyd along 
with Casey and Dulles agreed that “our best course for the time being was to continue to 
sustain the dissidents by clandestine means. Operations to this end (some of which have 
already been completed) are being planned.” The British while supportive of this strategy, 
remained wary of any overt escalation which could create “a risk of foreign intervention, 
perhaps leading ultimately to a Spanish Civil War situation.
173”  
 
However, the hopes of Australia, British and American foreign policy-makers that the rebels 
would act as a military and political bulwark on Sumatra against Sukarno and the PKI began 
to unravel in March. The cause of this unraveling was the ability of the Indonesian Army to 
undertake a major combined arms offensive against rebel strongholds on Sumatra. Before the 
Indonesian Army offensive, the optimism for the rebel cause expressed in the perceived 
inability of the Indonesia Army and its leadership to plan and then carry out such a complex 
operation in such a politically charged atmosphere. The Indonesian Army was also believed 
to simply be too tied down in existing counter-insurgency operations in West Java against 
Darul Islam rebels to be effective. In a report from November 1957, the Australian Joint 
Intelligence Committee had predicted that the Indonesia army would only be able to contain 
the dissidents-including the rebels in Sumatra and Suluwesi- an operation which absorbed 
80% of the field strength of the Army and the Mobile Police Brigade. The Air Force was in a 
similar position, tied down with counter-insurgency duties while the navy had reverted to an 
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anti-smuggling force. In these circumstances the report stated that “There is little prospect at 
present of any significant reduction in dissident activity by military means.
174”  
 
American officials agreed with their Australian colleagues in terms of the fighting prowess of 
the Indonesian Army. Allen Dulles during a National Security Council meeting on the 27 
February noted that the Central Government had only conducted sporadic bombing raids 
against the rebels because “Sukarno was not entirely sure of his army…perhaps half of the 
army forces deployed on Java would prove loyal to Sukarno. But even so, they were not very 
enthusiastic about an attack on Sumatra.” While concern that the dissidents had “moved 
rather too fast and made their decision and delivered their ultimatium without carefully 
counting their military assets”, Dulles was confident of the rebels gaining the upper hand, 
“The Sumatran soldiers were the best fighter in the Indonesia armed forces.” The President 
who was in attendance stated that the United States would “have to go in” if the 
circumstances were dire. Secretary Dulles elaborated on this point by stating that an overt 
intervention’s chances of success “…were better today, with the assistance of an indigenous 
government on Sumatra, than they would be later on, when we might have to intervene 
without such a cover.
175”  
 
The perception that the Indonesia Army was too weak to conduct a major operation against 
the dissenters was dashed on the 12 March as the Indonesia Army launched a three-pronged 
naval and airborne assault on Eastern Sumatra. In the first phase Indonesia paratroopers 
launched a surprise attack on the airfield at Pekanbaru, 120 miles-193 kilometres-from the 
rebel stronghold at Padang. The attack, which caught the rebel defenders by surprise, netted a 
large haul of American-made heavy machine guns, anti-aircraft gun and copious amounts of 
ammunition, some of which had just been delivered by parachute by an unmarked four-
engine aircraft according to Indonesian Army spokesman Lt Col Pirugarde.
176
 The Second 
phase involved a drive up the Siak River by Indonesia Marines to Pekanbaru to reinforce the 
paratroopers there, while the third phases involved an amphibious assault by troops of the 
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Braijaya Division on a Caltex refinery at the port of Dumai. Rebel spokesman on Radio 
Padang and in Singapore countered government claims, by asserting that a full battalion of 
rebel soldiers- 900 men- had counterattacked against the airfield at Pekanbaru, engaging the 
newly arrived paratroopers in fierce hand-to-hand combat.  All three assault were intended to 
secure Pekanbaru then advance on the key rebel strongholds at Buttinggi and Padang.
177
 The 
offensive planned by General Nasution from his headquarters on the island of Tanjung 
Pinang- located close enough to Singapore to monitor naval traffic- revealed that the 
Indonesian Army was more than willing to do battle with the rebels. The patriotic outrage of 
military figures such as General Nasution and his second in commander Colonel-soon to be 
General- Yani at the dissenters for abandoning the cause of Indonesian unity was the catalyst 
for the tough action.  
The beginning of the offensive occurred just when SEATO member nations were meeting in 
Manila, the Philippines,to discuss the ongoing situation in Indonesia. Gathered together were 
all the main player involved in Operation Haik, or with a working knowledge of the 
operation, including Richard Casey. The lightning offensive around Pekanbaru, caught many 
of the delegates by surprise. During a breakfast meeting between Secretary Dulles, Assistant 
Secretary Robertson, Ambassador to the Philippines Charles E. “Chip” Bohlen with 
Philippines President Garcia, the President expressed his views on the unfolding events in 
Sumatra. Garcia feared that the rebellion would shortly be militarily defeated and the position 
of President Sukarno, the PKI and even the Soviet Union would be enhanced throughout 
Indonesia. Dulles and Robertson reassured their erstwhile ally that it “was by no means clear 
that Sukarno would be able to dispose of the rebels so easily.
178”  
The National Security Council in Washington D.C also expressed its surprise at events 
around Pekanbaru. Dulles acknowledged that the position of the dissidents was “precarious” 
although “not yet hopeless” and stated “If Sukarno succeed in knocking them out quickly, it 
would be a feather in Sukarno’s cap and in that of the Communists.179” The rebels had indeed 
suffered a serious military setback, but for the SEATO powers meetings at Manila, it was 
deemed that support must continue to prevent an even worse disaster.  The mood in Jakarta, 
as reported by U.S. Ambassador Jones, was buoyed by initial government victories. 
Although, the fighting remained in flux, for military and Central Government leaders, 
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military action had shown “rebels, fence-sitters and the world that Central Government has 
power [to] move at will in Central Sumatra…180”  
 
As dawn broke over Padang on the 17 April, the serenity was shattered by the thunder of 
Indonesian Government warships unleashing as systematic bombardment of rebel positions in 
and around the city. As the smoke of the naval bombardment cleared, Indonesian air force 
Mustangs and Mitchell bombers appeared over the city, releasing their bullets, rockets and 
bombs on both rebel defenders and civilians alike. By 06:40, government paratroopers had 
secure Tabing airfield on the outskirts of the city, while in an uncontested landing General 
Yani troops were able to secure Padang before the end of the day. The rebel defenders had 
either chosen to surrender without a fight to Central Government forces, melted away into the 
West Sumatran hinterland or fled towards the rebel capital at Bukittinggi.
181
 The collapse of 
organized resistance on Sumatra and the fading of any hope of the rebels forming an 
alternative government presented a dire picture for Australian, British and American leaders 
and diplomats.  
Even before General Yani’s troops stormed ashore at Padang, the debacle at Pekanbaru raised 
serious doubts over the viability of the rebels as a source of anti-communist strength in 
Indonesia. Padang made the point even less opaque. Sir Harold Caccia, British Ambassador 
in Washington expressed to John Forster Dulles and Walter Robertson the view that it may be 
advisable for “an approach to Sukarno to see if it were possible to exact a satisfactory 
political settlement,” particularly as Soviet arms, supplies and technicians began arriving to 
supplement the Central Government war effort.
182
 Jones was even more scathing. Writing to 
Robertson eleven days before the assault on Padang, he stated that the “[R]ebels are losing 
ground fast militariliy” and that their poor showing at Pekanbaru meant that “this leaves 
guerrilla warfare as their only resort.” For Jones, the rebels adopting a “DI (Darul Islam) 
style” of resistance made the prospects of developing an alternate anti-communist 
government by military and economic pressure negligible.
183
 In Washington, Australian 
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Ambassador Howard Beale expressed the growing misgivings of his government towards the 
dissidents who appeared “disunited” and “not likely to make a successful stand.” The 
Ambassador also articulated the anxiety of the Australian Government in granting belligerent 
status to the rebels, a move considered by both London and Washington.
184
  
 
As the military situation deteriorated for the rebels on Sumatra, Australian diplomats and 
military officials became increasingly active in seeking a new approach to President Sukarno, 
the Indonesian Army and halting the spread of Communism in Indonesia. While initially 
supportive of covert actions at the highest levels of the Australian government, the fading 
strength and momentum of the rebel cause made change necessary. As rebel military 
capabilities collapsed throughout April on Sumatra, Australian and British military and 
intelligence officials came to similar conclusions with regard to the outlook for the rebellion. 
On the 26 April, nine days after the Central Government forces captured Padang, the British 
Joint Intelligence Committee (Far East) assessed the situation in Indonesia for the Defence 
Sub-Committee of the British Government. This “Top Secret” report painted a dire picture of 
the rebel resistance and of the cause of anti-communism in Indonesia. On Sumatra “the 
dissidents have failed to induce the Central Government to conclude a compromise 
settlement” and were “unlikely to wage an effective guerrilla war”. Resistance on the Celebes 
islands (Suluwesi) was predicted to continue “with covert foreign support but could not resist 
an all-out attack by the Central Government.”  
The report also saw Communist influence growing steadily and the role of the Soviet Union 
and Communist China dramatically increasing. The rebellion, rather than undermining the 
power of President Sukarno had only strengthened his hold in Jakarta, an alarming issue for 
the both the US and Australia. The report stated that “[H]e (Sukarno) will not willingly yield 
to any group the substance of his power. For this reason he will not genuinely seek 
compromise that will satisfy the legitimate grievances of his opponents at home.” The PKI 
was the other big winner in the report.
185
 By identifying itself with Indonesian nationalism 
and giving full-throated support to Sukarno’s campaign to crush the dissidents, it had 
increased its influence with the President. The officials who produced the report also 
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ominously warned of the increased activity of the Communist bloc in Indonesia. Due to the 
deteriorating economic conditions following the Dutch take-over and the need for technical 
and military aid to defeat the dissidents, the Soviet Union was rapidly increasing its footprint 
in a strategically vital area of Southeast Asia. The Central government ratified a $100 million 
(US dollar) loan which saw the arrival of technicians related to recent arms, shipping, aircraft 
and commerce purchases. This put the Soviet Union in direct competition with the West in 
Indonesia.
186
 With anti-western and particularly anti-American sentiments running hot due to 
the perceived role of the United States in supporting the rebels, the  situation had the potential 
to be a major setback for containment in the region.  
 
The Australian Joint Intelligence Committee report produced two days earlier on the 24
 
April 
matched the British one in its dire predictions for the future Western position in Indonesia. 
The report, the conclusions of which were accepted by the Chiefs of Staff and Secretary of 
the Department of External Affairs matched the British report in predicting the demise of the 
dissidents on Sumatra and the Celebes as a viable military and political force, the increase in 
power of Sukarno and the PKI, and the growth of Communist bloc involvement. The 
Australia report also predicted the decline in the role of moderate Indonesian political parties 
such as Masjumi, which had had a strong anti-communist position. These parties were tainted 
by “a number of leading members have in fact joined the Padang Government.”  
What both reports had in common was that the future cause of anti-Communism in Indonesia 
relied on the role of the newly emboldened Indonesian Army. The Australian JIC report 
noted that “[A]rmy leaders generally and operational commanders particularly will expect 
Presidential and government recognition of their support and their military successes… the 
influential position they have gained through their role in the administration and as the main 
support of the Central government authority will further be bolstered by this demonstration  
of their military capabilities and the accuracy of their intelligence.” The prestige and power 
of the Army was seen by senior Australian military and intelligence officials as the only force 
capable of balancing Sukarno and the PKI. “The Army is now the major political obstacle to 
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a continuing increase of Communist influence, and may have increased its capacity for 
political action as a result of its military successes…”187  
In reaction to the growing unrest in Indonesia and the leftward shift in the dynamics domestic 
politics, Australian politicians and diplomats had enthusiastically supported Operation Haik. 
They had worked assiduously with their colleagues in London and Washington D.C to 
support the regional rebels as an alternative government to the Central Government in 
Jakarta. In supporting this risky endeavor, the Menzies government hoped to rollback the 
leftward drift engulfing Indonesian domestic politics, particularly with the advent of Guided 
Democracy. This growing instability in Indonesia coincidence with the growing concern that 
Australia hopes to contain the issue of West New Guinea in cold storage were failing. In can 
be speculated that in supporting the rebels are their desire for a change of government in 
Jakarta, Australian leaders hoped for a change of attitude on West New Guinea.  
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Chapter Four 
 
From Covert Operations to Rapprochement 
At dawn on the 18 May 1958, the drone of a lone aircraft sheared through the curtain of 
stillness that hung over the city of Ambon. The roar of the twin-engined B-26 bomber - 
bristling with eight nose-mounted heavy machine guns; with bombs and rockets slung 
menacingly under its wings, had become a terrifying part of normal life for the residents of 
this vibrant costal city. Throughout April and early May, the city had become the target of 
PRRI rebel aircraft operating from airfields in Northern Suluwesi. The city, known for its 
religious diversity had become a staging area for Central government forces in their efforts to 
retake Suluwesi. As the B-26 attacked government targets around Ambon, it was caught in a 
melee with Indonesian government aircraft and ground-based anti-aircraft guns. In the 
ensuring struggle, the B-26 was crippled and the crew bailed out. The Indonesian troops who 
captured the pilot and his navigator, made a profound discovery. The pilot, although badly 
wounded was an American, on a covert mission for the Central Intelligence Agency.
188
  
 
The capture of Allen L. Pope, a combat veteran of both the Korean War and Franco-
Vietnamese War, accelerated the collapse of the covert support the Eisenhower 
Administration had been providing to the regional dissidents. Pope’s capture was a turning 
point in a strategy that throughout April and May was being increasingly questioned in 
Washington D.C, London, and Canberra. The reason for Pope’s attack on Ambon that 
morning had been because of the Indonesian army’s success on Sumatra had allowed it to 
transfer forces to crush rebel resistance on Suluwesi. The dramatic turn-around in American 
policy towards Indonesia would cause Australian politicians and diplomats to reassess the 
Australian-Indonesian relationship in the aftermath of the humiliating defeat of the rebels and 
the collapse of the Eisenhower-Dulles covert strategy.  
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Following the collapse of rebel resistance around Padang in mid-April, diplomats in both 
Canberra and Washington began looking for alternatives to the covert operations policy. As 
the rebels in Sumatra withdrew into the jungle and countryside, away from major population 
centres, considerable doubts were held regarding the whole enterprise. On the 18
 
April, 
Arthur Tange, the secretary of External Affairs met with the Netherlands Ambassador to 
Australia A.H.J Lovink to discuss the situation in Indonesia. Lovink stated that even 
moderate Indonesian politicians such as Djuanda and Subrandrio wanted to see rebel 
resistance crushed before granting  “genuine concession[s] to provincial interests.” He also 
alluded to the fact that there were senior political and military leaders in Jakarta who sought 
co-operation with the West to counter the growing Soviet bloc involvement in Indonesia.
189
 A 
similar opinion was expressed in a memorandum to Tange from the Australian High 
Commission in Singapore. The memorandum noted that with guerrilla resistance “written 
off” in Sumatra and the PKI expected to make more electoral gains in 1959,  the best thing 
for “the West” to do was “to endeavour to keep the Army on side.”  This could be achieved 
by meeting its requests for “hardware and training…the goal of most Indonesian army 
officers was a course of training in the United States… [rather] than the relative austerity of 
the Soviet Union.”190  
 
Across the Pacific, American officials were coming to similar conclusions. Ambassador 
Jones in Jakarta pressed Walter Robinson to abandon the cause of Padang and embrace 
Jakarta. Jones believed that the rebels had passed their used by date as an asset, telling 
Robertson that “I have always thought of Padang-I think you agree- as a tactic, as a means of 
bringing leverage on situation in Java to force new political direction on central government.” 
However, he continued, “It is unanimous view [of] Embassy staff that pro-American officers 
still hold balance of power in army…if new anti-Communist government is formed, it must 
depend upon army for support and implementation of policy.” The provision of military aid 
would “bring pressure on Sukarno through army and other channels to obtain reorganization 
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of government.”191 Chief of Naval Operations Arleigh Burke concurred with this approach. In 
a letter to Under Secretary of State Herter, Burke describes a conversation with a certain 
Colonel Berlin, the STANVAC representative in Indonesia- a man well acquainted with the 
countries key political and military leaders. The mysterious Colonel Berlin met with General 
Nasution, and painted a dire picture of the Indonesian Republic. Berlin saw the ambitious 
Nasution and the Army as “[T]he only force in the GOI (Government of Indonesia) which 
will prevent that government from becoming communist is in the Army.”192 The Joint Chiefs 
of Staff were not immune to the growing dangers in Indonesia. General Maxwell Taylor, who 
had advised Eisenhower against a military intervention to save the French Expeditionary 
Force at Dien Bien Phu, again voiced his opposition to an overt American intervention, in 
this case to save the rebels. Taylor went further in describing the value of the Indonesian 
Army as an anti-communist bulwark “ [P]rior to the current military operations, the 
Indonesian Army under Nasution was considered to be the strongest anti-communist force in 
Indonesia. U.S. support for Nasution… might influence him to take positive action to prevent 
a communist take-over by political or other means.”193 
 
These internal deliberations in Washington on the viability of the Army as a better balancer 
to the PKI than the regional rebels, caused no serious change on the ground. Throughout 
April and early May, rebels on Suluwesi received aircraft, spare parts, pilots, and instructors 
from both the United States and Taiwan to support the rebel war effort. According to Kahin 
and Kahin, both the Indonesian Central Government and the Rebels (with their American and 
Chinese advisors) believed that air superiority would be crucial in the struggle following the 
fall of Padang. During the fighting in Sumatra, the government’s ability to control the air and 
attack rebel strongholds and supply lines at will-even with relatively few aircraft- proved to 
be vital in breaking the back of organised rebel resistance on the island. Throughout April, B-
25 Mitchell medium bombers and Douglas B-26 Invader light-bombers began arriving at 
rebel controlled airfields in Suluwesi as well as operating from airfields in the Southern 
Philippines. Crewed by a mixture of Americans (employed by the CIA), Taiwanese, 
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Indonesians and Filipinos, these aircraft began hitting targets throughout Eastern Indonesia. 
Targeting military bases, civilian infrastructure, shipping between islands, oil refineries and 
attempting to destroy any government aircraft they encountered. Both Eisenhower and Dulles 
believed that the provisioning of air support would lift rebel morale after the debacle in 
Sumatra and give the rebels the mobility and support they needed for their own amphibious 
operations.
194
  
 
Running counter to this theory was a chorus of voices in Washington, Jakarta, and Canberra 
who saw the provisioning of air support to be a flawed strategy. In a telegram, newly –
appointed Ambassador Jones pointed out the need for the U.S. government to halt rebel air 
activity. In a discussion with Subandrio, the Foreign Minister indicated that rebel aerial 
activity was antagonising the army and (quoting Subandrio) “anti-American sentiment in 
army was growing as result of conviction strong U.S. support for rebels and urged America to 
do something soon which would reverse this trend.” Subandrio also noted that the “foreign 
bombing” was aggravating Indonesian nationalism, particularly the deaths of civilians 
“Killings of innocent people by bombings has resulted in such strong reaction within 
Indonesia against rebels that (a) rebel movement has become object (of) violent popular 
reaction in Ambon and other places and (b) difficulty of GOI settling conflict at this [stage] 
immeasurably increased.”195 Ironically, two days before during an NSC meeting Allen Dulles 
had  praised the achievements of the rebels stating “the dissidents have staged a successful 
series of air strikes-almost too effective in certain instances, since they resulted in the sinking 
of a British and of a Panamanian freighter. These raids were still run on a shoestring basis 
with a few P-51s and B-26s.”196  
Australian officials also began to speak out against the counter-productivity of rebel air 
activity. Australian Ambassador Lawrence McIntyre in a pair of urgent cables sent to 
Canberra on the 30
  
April and 1 May noted the widespread and sometimes indiscriminate use 
of airpower by the rebels, targeting military and civilian targets as well as foreign assets-such 
as the Shell refinery at Balikpapan. The air attacks by the rebels, McIntyre speculated, was 
intended to hinder the ability of the Central Government to attack Suluwesi, and to 
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“internationalise the dispute in hope of provoking open foreign and ultimately United Nations 
intervention even at this late stage.” As long as Jakarta’s prestige was threatened by these air 
attacks “it would be unrealistic to expect much if any progress towards reorganisation in 
Djakarta and ultimate political settlement.”197  
 
On the same day, McIntyre again warned Canberra that rebel air attacks must be stopped. The 
American and Chinese Nationalist “adventurers” were “…responsible for air aid to Suluwesi 
rebels, and that this could be dangerous for relations between Indonesia and other countries.” 
McIntyre worried that the “possible effects of outside intervention at this late stage , which 
might conceivably protract rebel pressure on Central Government but is more likely to do no 
more than delay the inevitable, with unwelcome consequences for all of us.” The ambassador 
made a stark appraisal of  Indonesian policy-making in Washington. McIntyre believed 
Ambassador Jones was “…not getting his ideas across sufficiently in Washington (except 
perhaps for Walter Robertson), and is not being kept fully in picture by State Department.”198  
 
The lack of attention that Ambassador Jone’s opinions were receiving in Washington was 
symptomatic of a war within the State Department in relation to Indonesia policy. Australian 
diplomats throughout late April and early May would ally themselves with those mid to high 
level officials in the Far Eastern Bureau and Southwest Pacific Bureau against the Secretary 
of State and his supporters. Ambassador Howard Beale in Washington agreed with 
McIntyre’s assessment of the wrong-headed approach being taken by elements in the State 
Department and CIA. In a conversation with Gordon Mein- seen as an interlocutor to Walter 
Robertson, head of the Far Eastern Bureau- the diplomat expressed his department’s view 
that “[T]he difficulty is in securing decisions as the highest level (i.e Dulles and 
Eisenhower).” Mein-and Robertson- argued that a “small amount of [American] aid” was 
essential, otherwise they believed that: “Indonesia and America [would] continue to circling 
each other in the present indecisive way, [and an] opportunity will be missed which might not 
recur. The Army officers and Indonesian politicians who are now genuinely looking to the 
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United States for help will become disillusioned and even hostile and this would leave the 
field wide open to communism.”199  
 
Beale also communicated to Richard Casey, that the Australian position in acquiescing to the 
current American covert strategy was becoming a dangerous policy black hole. In a flurry of 
diplomatic activity between the 10 and 12 May, Beale outlined to Casey the need to re-think 
Australian policy. In a conversation between Beale and Mein, Mein noted “…the State 
Department is considerably encouraged by Jone’s reports… [and] [T]hey now feel that 
possibilities for a general rapprochement between the Indonesian government and the United 
States have been improved…” Mein noted that “the Celebes revolt was likely to do more 
harm than good and could even destroy the present promising beginnings in Djakarta.” When 
Beale quizzed Mein on the freedom of action enjoyed by the rebels Mein said “that he was 
confident that they could be ‘cut off instantly’ if decisions were made to do so. He was 
clearly fearful, however, that this decision would not be made quickly enough at the highest 
levels. (Please protect Mein).” The cable also noted that the addition of American aid in the 
eyes of “congressional and public opinion” had to involve the Indonesian Government 
showing “a determination to check the growth of Communist influence and to reach a 
peaceful settlement with the dissidents.”200  
In a second cable on the 10
th
, (which has been heavily expunged), Beale request that Casey 
allow him to meet personally with John Foster Dulles on the situation in Indonesia. Beale 
notes that “…the continuance of the Celebes revolt and its influence on current developments 
in Djakarta you may consider that it is a topic which I should raise with Dulles. As seen from 
here the continuance of the bombing raids by Samual’s (rebel commander on Suluwesi) 
forces can do little but harm and you might feel that I should put this point of view to 
Dulles.” Beale goes on to inform Casey of the ongoing debates within the State Department 
and between the State Department and the CIA over the direction of Indonesia policy. He 
notes that an approach to John Foster Dulles was essential in order for a re-consideration of 
policy to even be considered, commenting that  “…matters are usually settled between the 
two Dulleses.” With the information he has gained- particularly from Mein- Beale believed 
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that “the State Department’s present attitude is sound. I should therefore be glad to have your 
authority to put to Foster Dulles the view expressed in paragraph one above.”201  
 
Casey replied to Beale’s request for talks with Dulles two days later. In this fascinating 
telegram, Casey expresses his growing scepticism to the covert operations program he and his 
Prime Minister initially endorsed. Casey noted “that if Samual’s activities are to an 
appreciable extent controlled by the Americans. If this is so then any offer or promise of 
American arms to Djakarta government would be cynically received if Samual’s activities 
continue and particularly if they increase.” Casey agreed with the sceptics of the covert path, 
noting that “[T]he risk of Celebes fighting developing into something bigger and more 
explosive is clear and has most unpleasant potentialities.” With the Central Government 
about to bring “newly acquired Russian aircraft into action…Samual’s activities have only a 
relatively short lease of life anyhow.” Casey saw Ambassador Jones discussions with General 
Nasution as “encouraging although not decisive…” In these circumstances, the Minister 
believed that the United States should offer a two-track approach to the Indonesians, “…press 
on with conditional offer of arms to Djakarta government and at the same time do whatever is 
possible to damp down Samual’s militant bombing, pending some evidence that American 
offer of arms to Djakarta Government begins to show some results.” The “results” Casey is 
implying are a firm commitment by elements in the Indonesian Government and Army to 
strongly oppose the growing power of the PKI.
202
  
 
Arms for Indonesia 
 
The shooting down of Pope on the 18 May, marked the failure of what Odd Arne Westad 
called “the most ambitious program of intervention, in effect trying to change the future 
political direction of the world’s most populous Muslim country.”203  Instead of establishing 
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anti-communist bulwarks on Sumatra and Suluwesi, the intervention had resulted in the re-
emergence of the coalition between mainstream Muslims, Communists, and nativist Army 
officers that had brought the Republic into being in the 1940s. Even the most vitriolic anti-
communist Army officers-some of whom had trained in the United States- swung back 
towards President Sukarno and the preservation of Indonesian territorial integrity. Providing 
arms and assistance to the rebels had led to a Soviet foothold in Indonesia rather than 
prevented it, as the Indonesian Army procured arms from Moscow to supplement its war-
effort. 
204
 
 
With limited support from Chiang Kai-Shek, the rebels continued sporadic aerial operations. 
However, the American military, technical, and financial support ceased. In a meeting 
between Dulles and Beale on the 22
 
May, the Secretary of State told the Ambassador that “it 
had yesterday been decided to stop all aid for the present and he expected that the operations 
of the Celebes dissidents would now cease.” Although Dulles did add a caveat to his 
statement, the United States “…intended that the embers [of rebellion] would be kept alive so 
that if need arose in the future these could again be blown into flame.” The statement 
reflected the caution Dulles attached to the new military aid program to Jakarta, particularly 
if there was no action against the PKI or turn against the Soviets.
205
 As noted above the 
emergence of the provisioning of arms and support to the Indonesian Army had existed 
concurrently with the covert track. A month before Pope was shot down over Ambon, the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff had recommended to the Secretary of Defense McElroy that an approach 
be made to General Nasution with Ambassador Jones playing an intermediary role.
206
  
 
For Australian diplomats and politicians the decision of the Eisenhower Administration to 
begin courting the Indonesian Army with increased military aid and training, raised difficult 
questions particularly with regard to West New Guinea. The military successes of the 
Indonesian Army highlighted not only their nationalist credentials, but also their desire to 
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uphold the territorial integrity of Indonesia-including West New Guinea. The Menzies 
Government feared that providing arms to Indonesia without guarantees of their use could 
lead to aggression against the Dutch, something the Australian Government had vowed to 
stop.  Alexander McClure Smith, the Australian Ambassador to the Hague, informed Casey 
that Australia should remain cautious and kept relatively silent on the new American strategy 
as according to him “[W]e think that what is happening there at present could well decide the 
future of the whole of Indonesia and that we therefore cannot afford to see any chance of 
promoting a favourable developments in Djakarta being neglected.”207 Smith recommended 
that the Americans be continuously informed of the concerns of the Australians and the 
Dutch with regard to West New Guinea. However, he also urged Australia to be cautious in 
what support it gave to the Dutch during this relatively ambiguous phase.  
 
From June 1958 until February 1959, Australian politicians and diplomats sought to garner 
from their “Great and Powerful friends”- the United States and United Kingdom- the future 
direction of their Indonesia policy. Australian diplomats made a concerted effort to 
understand the evolution of policy in Washington D.C and London, while at the same time 
ensuring its vital national interests were preserved. At the core of the Australian approach 
was that some deterrents be applied to the Indonesians by the United States and United 
Kingdom in order to protect West New Guinea, and at the same time prevent a Communist 
take-over of Indonesia. Australian leaders were particularly concerned about the acquisition 
by the Indonesians of “offensive” weapons through the United States or United Kingdom-
such as landing craft, destroyers, jet aircraft, and heavy weapons- that might be used to 
threaten or seize West New Guinea from the Dutch. Since 1950, Australia had painted itself 
into a corner on West New Guinea, particularly in relation to the symbolic value attached to 
the territory in the broader Australian electorate. Pressure from the Dutch for Australia to 
continue supporting its position and domestic pressure not to back down to Indonesian 
irredentism, made the situation extremely delicate for the Menzies government.  
 
In this period, Australia tried to ride two horses at the same time. On one hand, supporting 
American efforts to undermine the strength of the PKI by supporting moderate political 
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leaders and the Indonesia Army, on the other hand lobbying the Americans to put in place 
safeguards to prevent Indonesia using its newly acquired military and economic aid to seize 
West New Guinea.  Ambassador Howard Beale asked Secretary Dulles “…whether any 
conditions would be imposed on the sale of military equipment to Indonesia” and wondered 
“if the success of the Indonesian military forces in mounting and carrying out the campaign 
in Sumatra might not change the picture [with regards to WNG].” Dulles remained evasive 
on the question of conditions for arms sales-this evasiveness can be put down to the lack of 
concrete U.S. policy. He also poured cold water on the idea that the Indonesians were more 
capable of launching a major attack on West New Guinea, stating that “without Soviet Bloc 
assistance Indonesia would not be capable of mounting any such operation.”208  
 
Australian diplomats and politicians remained sceptical, particularly as the scope of the aid 
became known in August. On the 13 August, the United States signed its initial aid 
agreement with the Jakarta government. The aid came in the form of token military assistance 
totalling $7 million, additional slots for Indonesian officers in U.S military training schools, 
and funds for the construction of military infrastructure. The signing of the aid agreement 
marked the passing of the Dulles covert strategy towards Indonesia, and the emergence of a 
less dogmatic approach. Even with this more pragmatic approach being solidified, Australian 
concerns lingered. In a cable to Washington, Ambassador Sebald outlined the fears of Prime 
Minister Menzies with regard to the new policy. Menzies earnestly told the Ambassador that 
the supply of U.S. arms and equipment to Indonesia was “…one problem which could defeat 
his government in coming election would be wave of Australian resentment against growing 
strength [of] Indonesia because of United States arms policy and possibility Indonesia might 
in consequence take aggressive action against West New Guinea.” Menzies, concerned for 
Australia’s long-term security hoped that the United States would be able to provide “…some 
deterrent…against Indonesian ambitions” This he hoped would come through a guarantee 
that the “…United States would make it crystal-clear to Indonesia that if any arms furnished 
by United States were used for aggression against New Guinea United States would take 
appropriate action.”209 Menzies also expressed his concern to British Prime Minister Harold 
Macmillan, that there were dangers in rushing the new approach to Indonesia without taking 
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into consideration long-term interests (West New Guinea). In a private letter to Menzies, 
Macmillan outlines the conversation he and Selwyn Lloyd had with Richard Casey on arms 
shipments to Indonesia. While understanding of Menzies concern with public opinion and the 
uncertainty on the political trajectory of Indonesia, Macmillan made it explicit that proving 
much needed military equipment is both in Britain’s national interest, but in the best interest 
of the West. Macmillan states “ [W]e of course have very large investments there [Indonesia] 
and very great trading interests and we are far from happy at the prospect of  Indonesia 
building up a Navy and Air Force acquired wholly from Communist sources.”210  
 
Australian leaders were not only wary about the prospects of the United States and other 
NATO members providing arms to Indonesia, but also the danger of the Dutch seeking some 
type of guarantee from Australia to defend West New Guinea from attack. During a meeting 
between Australian and American officials in Washington D.C, Richard Casey outlined the 
Australian predicament. “The Dutch” Casey stated “have asked the Australian Government 
for assurances of support in case of an Indonesian attack against West New Guinea.” While 
Australia had discussed all aspects of the dispute with the Dutch, it had refrained from 
providing concrete security guarantees. With Australia reluctant to support the Dutch due to 
the potential impact on Australian relations with the region, Casey noted that “[T]he United 
States is in the best possible position to exercise the most effective deterrent by placing 
conditions on any economic or military aid it might extend to Indonesia.”211  
 
Australia walks the tightrope 
By mid-1958, the Outer-Island rebellion was spluttering to its inglorious conclusion. In 
Sumatra and Suluwesi, attempts to establish alternative regional governments had failed. In 
military terms, the rebels still were able to conduct guerrilla activity against the Central 
Government. However, foreign support via the United States had ceased and the rebels 
lacked the military edge to reshape the political situation in Jakarta. For Australia, while the 
danger of civil war in Indonesia receded, a new threat arose from the ashes of rebellion. A 
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threat aimed at Dutch control of West New Guinea. As mentioned above, the Indonesia 
Army, had emerged not only as a potential anti-communist bulwark, but as a bastion of 
Indonesian nationalism and revolutionary fervour. This emotional nationalism was directed at 
the acquisition of West New Guniea. The Army was just one element of the three-way 
political fulcrum that desired the return of West New Guinea, the other two elements being 
President Sukarno and the PKI. President Sukarno saw the Army as the natural force that 
balanced the ever-powerful PKI, Sukarno also allied himself with the PKI in order to gain 
support for his program of guided democracy. Both the Army and PKI believed they could 
use their influence with the President to shape domestic and foreign policy.  
 
While differing in political, ideological, and economic viewpoints, what united all these 
disparate elements was the desire to take West New Guinea. On the 17
 
August 1958, 
President Sukarno devoted a substantial portion of his Independence Day address to the issue 
of  West Irian. Sukarno declared that “[T]he political stage of our revolution has not been 
quite completed yet…our political authority has not yet extended to West Irian…For seven 
years we have tried to change the attitude of the Dutch by “sweet reasoning and persuasion” 
without any result. Consequently, we were forced to take “another course” which is known 
under the name “West Irian action.” This other course reflected the fire and strength of our 
fighting spirit.” Sukarno, ever the thespian, alluded to the Shakespeare’s Prince of Denmark 
from Hamlet in reflecting the absolute desire of the nation to see West Irian in Indonesian 
hands “ …the Indonesian people are not a nation of crocking frogs or a nation like Hamlet, 
could not make up its mind…”212 
This rhetoric was matched by a growing Indonesia military capability that made the Dutch 
(and therefore the Australian) strategic position increasingly vulnerable. By end the 1958, the 
Indonesia military was receiving military aid from both Cold War superpowers. The 
Eisenhower Administration was providing by November 1958 $15 million in military 
assistance. The Indonesia Army, led by Army Chief of Staff Nasution, received the bulk of 
this- $9.6 million- intended to fully equip 20 infantry battalions and ensure that Nasution and 
the Army remained anti-Communist bastions. The Soviet Union also lavished arms onto the 
Indonesia military particularly the Air Force and Navy. Indonesian pilots in the Eastern bloc 
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and Egypt were being trained to operate MiG 17 fighters and Il-28 light jet bombers. While 
the Navy received new landing craft, Motor Torpedo Boats and other amphibious assault 
ships.
213
  
The Dutch feared that this nascent military capability would be combined with Indonesian 
diplomatic pressure to force them out. The Indonesians still lacked the logistical capacity to 
launch a full-blooded invasion of the territory. However, even a minor Indonesia action 
(involving a raid by paratroopers or commando forces) was viewed as a diplomatic defeat for 
the Dutch, since it would mean the issue of Dutch New Guinea would be brought before the 
UN, where the assertive Afro-Asian bloc of countries had no love for Dutch colonialism.
214
 
The Australian military Joint Intelligence Committee noted the “[S]erious possibility that the 
Indonesians are planning an attack on Netherlands New Guinea (as early as March and 
coupled with action in the United Nations). The most likely form of such an attack would be 
infiltration of commando or paratrooper groups, possibly up to battalion strength.”215  
As the Indonesia desire to escalate the struggle increased, the Dutch desire to resist was in 
serious decline. By the late 1950s, Dutch New Guinea was viewed by the international 
community as anachronistic throwback of imperialism and by the Dutch public as a wasteful 
and exotic luxury. The last jewel in what had been the Netherland East Indies “Girdle of 
Emeralds” had lost its lustre.216 According to Arend Lijphardt, following the epoch of the 
inclusion of the territory in the Dutch constitution, its value had declined precipitously. 
Business interests in the Netherlands bemoaned the fact that Dutch intransigence on New 
Guinea hindered their ability to explore the Indonesia market and seek new markets in Asia, 
while the territory itself was of little long-term economic potential. The issue of Dutch New 
Guinea gained prominence among senior members of the Dutch Reformed Church- the 
largest church on the Dutch Ecumenical Council. J. Verkuyl, a spokesman for the Reformed 
mission in Indonesia saw a more conciliatory approach towards Indonesia as not only a good 
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way to improve Dutch-Indonesian relations but also to the cause of Protestantism in 
Indonesia.
217
 Also, by the mid-1950s, the Dutch colonisation societies had become less 
effective at promoting the idea of a Eurasian fatherland in West New Guinea, particularly at 
attracting potential settlers from the Netherlands.
218
  
 The Netherlands was also changing as a country. The slogan attached to a pamphlet in 1914 
“Indies gone, prosperity done” had absolutely no connection with a country increasingly 
integrated into the post-war European economic system. By the late 1950s, the Netherlands 
was prospering as part of the European Coal and Steel community, the Common Market, and 
Euratom. The loss of the East Indies had not brought on economic collapse but on the 
contrary resulted in increased average national income per capita of 3.5%, consistently low 
unemployment figures 1.2% in 1957 and a spectacular increase in population size.
219
  
 
If the Dutch domestic situation provided little encouragement for the nation’s imperial 
endeavours, the international environment held limited prospects for long-term Dutch 
retention of West New Guinea. In particular, the reluctance of the United States and United 
Kingdom, Holland’s two major NATO allies, to support the Dutch militarily in the event of 
an Indonesian attack. 
 The United States due to its preponderance of power in the Asia-Pacific, was viewed as the 
power with the most scope to guarantee Dutch interests in the region. However, the shift from 
a covert operations strategy to courting the Indonesia Army meant President Eisenhower and 
Secretary Dulles were fearful of creating further rifts with the Indonesians, particularly on the 
highly emotional issue of West New Guinea. In a private meeting between President 
Eisenhower and Netherlands Foreign Minister Joseph Luns, the Foreign Minister stressed his 
nation’s continual claim to the territory and his concern over United States arms deliveries to 
Jakarta. Due to this strong claim and the desire of the natives “to stay free of the 
Indonesians…”, Luns asked Eisenhower to support a joint Dutch-Australian statement to 
deter Indonesian aggression.  Eisenhower remained ambivalent, while strongly supporting the 
principle of “no territorial expansion by force of arms” in the Far East, he also stressed the 
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important safeguards attached to the U.S. arms being sent to Indonesia.
220
 The Department of 
Defense, while sensitive to Dutch concerns over Indonesian aggression and keenly aware of 
the staunch support the Netherlands had provided to the United States in NATO and the UN , 
did not wish its Indonesia program to be held hostage to “Dutch objections”. If the program 
was delayed any longer due to the Dutch it could result “…in the deterioration of our position 
in Indonesia and the ascendancy of the Communist Bloc.” This could mean a major blow to 
American containment policy in Southeast Asia.
221
  
Secretary of State Dulles reflected his President’s feelings during a meeting six days later 
with Netherlands Ambassador J.H. van Roijen. Dulles informed Roijen that if force were 
used “…the Dutch could undoubtedly count on our following the same pattern in dealing 
with that situation as we have followed in comparable cases elsewhere.” This ambiguous 
statement, that included no military commitment, was coupled with the desire that the 
Eisenhower Administration had to seek “consultations with Congress and Congressional 
authorization” before giving any type of commitment as to whether military action would be 
taken in the event of Indonesian aggression. This desire for Congressional authorization 
reflected President Eisenhower’s commitment to not overreaching his Presidential authority 
in terms of foreign affairs but also keeping the American people informed of the strategic 
goals of the United States in the Asia-Pacific.
222
 It also did not commit the United States to 
offering a blank cheque of support to the Dutch.  
 
Ambassador Jones in a telegram to the Department of State offered a critical appraisal of 
whether “continued Dutch presence [was]…essential to free world interests.” He answered 
this question in the “clear negative.” Jones did not recommend the immediate acquisition of 
sovereignty by Indonesia but instead some form of “…UN trusteeship with or without 
interested parties as trustees; a consortium outside UN or even unilateral US custodianship.”  
Jones, who was keenly aware that Indonesia could still pass under Communist domination, 
saw his strategy as a way of removing “…a political handhold for the Soviet Union” in the 
region, relieve the Dutch of their onerous colonial responsibility, and foster Indonesian 
goodwill and cooperation. Jones offered a stark warning that “…popular support among the 
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American public for military defence [of] New Guinea could hardly be classed as 
enthusiastic.” Also in terms of “global containment” of Communism, “…New Guinea could 
not be classed with other places in which free world has dug in, such as Berlin, Okinawa 
(Japan) and Taiwan. So as far as defense of ANZAM [was] concerned, there are several parts 
of Indonesian archipelago which would present more of a threat to that area should they fall 
into unfriendly hand than would New Guinea.”223  
 
For Australian policymakers and politicians, Indonesian nationalism, growing lack of Dutch 
resolve and United States global commitments was fast making a central plank of Australian 
foreign policy vulnerable. Dutch retention of West New Guinea was growing increasingly 
unstable under the dual blows of Dutch domestic opinion and Cold War expediency. By the 
end of 1958, the Menzies government felt that a wind of change was blowing through its 
West New Guinea policy, mainly as a result of the failures of the CIA covert operations 
during the Outer-Island Rebellion. President Eisenhower noted during a NSC meeting on the 
29 January that U.S. policy was “…on a better horse now than we had been during the 
organized rebellion in the outer-islands.”224 Unfortunately, that same horse was trampling 
Australian policy towards West New Guinea. The status-quo that Australian politicians had 
sought to maintain was proving to be untenable.  
Australian leaders did not share the strategic logic of their American colleagues. In a special 
study on New Guinea produced for cabinet, the strategic importance of West New Guinea 
was sacrosanct. The territory was vital to the concept of forward defence of the Australian 
mainland, particularly if Malaya had already been lost to a hostile regional or great power. 
West New Guinea also was linked geographically, through the Vogelkop peninsular, to the 
U.S Pacific island chain of bases and Asian allies. Due to its shared porous land border with 
Australian New Guinea, Australian politicians and diplomats feared that the political climate 
in West New Guinea could easily affect the Australian section. The report noted “If 
communist ideas, anti-white feelings or extreme nationalism were to gain currency in West 
New Guinea, the effect would no doubt be felt in due course in the eastern part of the 
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island.”225 As Australia slowly placed New Guinea on the path to political self-determination, 
events in Dutch New Guinea could potentially derail this process, leading to political 
instability and a power vacuum that could undermine Australian national interests. As Dutch 
moral flagged, Australian leaders sought to bolster the Dutch cause. However, not without 
support from its great and powerful friends, particularly the United States.  The Dutch had 
long hoped that Australia might be able to provide the necessary military assistance to not 
only deter the Indonesians, but assist in defeating any armed Indonesian aggression. While 
adamant that Dutch sovereignty should be guaranteed, Australian military support was not 
forthcoming.  In a report to cabinet on future discussions with the Dutch, the report notes that 
Australia would attempt to rally diplomatic opposition to any Indonesian aggression, however 
“we are not prepared to give any form of military commitment.” This reflected the Australian 
desire not to support the Dutch without at least American military support.
226
  
 
In a private meeting on the 17 January 1959 between Prime Minister Menzies and 
Netherlands Ambassador Lovink, the two men discussed Australian concerns with a military 
commitment to protect Dutch sovereignty. Menzies noted “there were very great difficulties 
about any arrangement with the Netherlands which were made independently of the United 
States and United Kingdom.” Indonesia with its expanding military capabilities “…might 
prove to be superior in arms to the Netherlands and Australia unless we were both assured 
active military support from the [U.S.] and [U.K].” If in the advent of a military clash 
between Indonesia and the Netherlands, Australia assisted the Dutch without American or 
British support, Menzies feared that Australia and the Dutch “would have a task so difficult 
that we might not be able to perform it.” The idea of Australia engaging in military action 
against an Asian country (Indonesia) without allied support for Menzies may have stirred 
dark memories of the Second World War and fears of abandonment by its major allies.  
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This fear that had existed since Federation would have been familiar to Menzies and his 
generation of Australian policy-makers as well as the public.
227
  
While reluctant to commit Australian forces to defend West New Guinea, Australian leaders 
remained adamant that the Dutch should hold their ground in protecting their sovereignty. To 
boost Dutch moral, the Menzies government hoped to build international support against any 
Indonesian use of force. This was to be accomplished by making it clear to the Indonesians 
that any aggression would result in the ending of Western military and economic aid as well 
as the loss of support of countries who had initially supported their claim to West New 
Guinea. It also entailed rallying the support of other countries such as India and the Asian 
members of SEATO (Pakistan, Thailand, and the Philippines) behind the premise that 
Indonesian aggression violated the United Nations charter. Above all, Australia and the 
Netherlands aimed to gain a public commitment from the United States that would condemn 
any Indonesian attempt to use armed force.
228
   
 
In the summer of 1959, the Australian government still stood with the Dutch publicly in their 
desire to resist Indonesian aggression and seek self-determination for the Papuans. However, 
it was becoming clear to senior policy-makers and defence officials in Canberra that 
continued support for the Dutch was unfeasible, when confronted with the military and 
diplomatic realities this would involve. In order to maintain a Western presence in the 
territory, Australia was confronted by unacceptable military and diplomatic options, with far-
reaching consequences. The aftermath of the Outer-Island rebellion proved to be a watershed 
in terms of the Australian approach to West New Guinea. The rebellion had emboldened 
those elements in Indonesian society-President Sukarno and the Army- who desired the return 
of West Irian. The United States wished to support these elements to balance the political 
power of the PKI, in order to uphold containment in Southeast Asia. The Dutch government 
and society in general were also losing their appetite for colonial adventures. The realities of 
this context were reflected in Australian government decision-making in early 1959.  
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On the 5 January, two weeks before Menzies cautioned the Dutch about Australian military 
support, Cabinet met to discuss the threat posed by Indonesia to the Netherlands New Guinea. 
In a report submitted to cabinet by Minister of Defence Athol Townley, the likelihood of an 
Indonesian attack and the possible Australian response was discussed. The Joint Intelligence 
Committee report painted a dire picture. The three key elements of Indonesian politics to 
emerge in the aftermath of the rebellion; President Sukarno, the Army and Chief of the 
General Staff Nasution, and the PKI, saw assertive action against West Irian as a way of 
boosting their nationalist credentials and solidifying domestic support. In terms of Indonesian 
military capacity, the report noted that despite the fragile nature of the Indonesian economy, 
the Indonesia naval and air capabilities were expanding-thanks to the Communist bloc- 
beyond the scope of defending territorial integrity. The acquisition of amphibious forces 
including “...two L.S.Ts, three L.C.Ts and a number of minor landing craft…” gave the 
Indonesian military the ability to launch both minor and major landings in West Irian.
229
  
The superpowers also figured prominently in the Australian assessment. The Soviet Bloc was 
seen to be taking advantage of the dispute according to the Joint Intelligence Committee. 
“The Bloc [Soviet Union and its allies] will see in the ‘West Irian’ issue another opportunity 
to further the communist policy of applying pressure on the West at scattered sensitive points. 
It would be in a better position now to influence the Indonesians to use force if this accords 
with Bloc policy at the time.” Compared to the Communist bloc, the position of the United 
States was unsettling. While it opposed “any military attack on Netherlands New Guinea,” 
the Australians were wary that American Cold War priorities would not coincide with 
Australian regional interests. The defence of West New Guinea was viewed as “a situation 
where the defence of the Free World’s interests against Communism was not directly 
involved.” In this situation “…the Administration might be unable to obtain congressional 
approval for military intervention in support of the Dutch.”230  
Faced with this military and diplomatic context, the Chiefs of Staff Committee drew up 
possible Australian military contingences to counter Indonesian military activity ranging 
from a small-scale incursion to major amphibious landing. This report would have been 
uncomfortable reading for the Menzies cabinet. The Chiefs of Staff were confident that 
Australia with Dutch support could defeat an Indonesian incursion. However, it would 
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involve not only the bulk of the Australian military’s available assets (including Australian 
forces that were part of the Commonwealth Reserve Force in Malaya) but also present major 
logistical challenges. Beside the military difficulties, any operation presented major 
diplomatic challenges. Any armed attack by the Indonesians would result in the issue being 
brought before the United Nations. The report noted that a lodgement by Indonesian forces 
would allow them to “take advantage of support in the United Nations from the Communist 
Bloc and the Afro-Asian group to secure a ceasefire and a negotiated settlement, which could 
be contrary to Australian and Dutch interests.” 231  
The confidence expressed by the military was offset by major deficiencies Australian forces 
would encounter operating without a major ally. “In the context of existing collective 
arrangements Australian defence policy has assumed that our forces will operate with major 
allies and these forces therefore have certain serious material limitations in their capabilities 
of operations envisaged.” This limitation, particularly in relation to “photographic and 
tactical reconnaissance, ground attack and anti-shipping strikes, afloat support, amphibious 
capabilities and air defence…” meant that although an Australian intervention may defeat any 
Indonesian invasion force, it might take longer, encounter great difficulties, face more 
casualties, and not be as decisive compared to an operation undertaken with American 
support. Unilateral Australian action could cause a major war with Indonesia, but also create 
a major diplomatic rupture with other Asian and non-aligned nations and potentially with the 
United States and Great Britain.
232
     
Confronted with this ominous dilemma, Cabinet rejected the use of military force to defend 
West New Guinea since “[T]he U.S.A and the U.K have declined to commit themselves in 
advance to military action against Indonesia.” Cabinet had already rejected the 1959 Strategic 
Basis report that proposed that Australia acquire an independent defence capability for action 
against Indonesia. This reflected the sacrosanct assertion by the Menzies government that 
Australia could only implement its forward defence  policy in conjunction with the United 
States and United Kingdom. The best protection against an aggressive China or Indonesia 
was to cultivate alliance ties with the United States rather than strike out independently. In 
these circumstances, a major Australian military commitment to West New Guinea was 
militarily, economically, politically, and diplomatically unfeasible. Therefore, the cultivation 
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of a friendly relationship with Indonesia was seen as diplomatically and militarily prudent 
compared to the risks associated with the existing West New Guinea policy. The report noted 
that “[T]he strategic importance of Indonesia is of greater significance to the United States 
and to Australia than Netherlands New Guinea and therefore it should be a major objective to 
keep Indonesia non-communist and friendly.” As a result of the rebellion and its aftermath, 
Australian politicians, diplomats and military officers came to realise that in the long-term 
interest of Australia security in a violate region, a non-antagonistic relationship with 
Indonesia was the preferred option to continual tensions over the future status of West New 
Guinea.
233
  
The clearest evidence of this new beginning in Australian-Indonesian relations was the visit 
of the Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio to Australia in February 1959. The visit and its 
consequences have a direct connection to the outcome of the Outer-Island rebellion. Australia 
continued to deter Indonesia from armed aggression against West New Guinea by eliciting 
guarantees from the U.S. and U.K that they would put restrictions on military equipment 
provided to Indonesia. This Menzies hoped would make up for the lack of Australian military 
support to the Dutch. The Subandrio visit fell into this category of deterrence. The joint 
communique issued by Richard Casey and Dr Subandrio noted that “…if any agreement were 
reached between the Netherlands and Indonesia as parties principal, arrived at by peaceful 
processes and in accordance with internationally accepted principles, Australia would not 
oppose such an agreement.” The communique went on to reiterate Australia’s desire that it 
would oppose any use of force by the Indonesians “…force should not be used by the parties 
concerned in the settlement of territorial dispute.”234  
 
 The communique sparked a firestorm not only with the Dutch but provoked major attacks on 
the Menzies Government from Labor as well as in the media, as a betrayal. It looked to many 
observers like a reversal of Australia’s decade long-stand to oppose any Indonesian effort to 
gain control of the territory. In reality, because of the aftermath of the rebellion and the 
policies that the Australian government had adopted, the strategic and political salience of 
Indonesia was now more vital than West New Guinea. The rebellion had buoyed the PKI 
rather than undermine its political power, the Indonesian military had seen its nationalist 
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credentials advanced in protecting Indonesian territorial integrity. In Canberra, London, and 
Washington D.C, the Army was viewed as the only power capable of matching the 
organisational strength and political appeal of the PKI. Between the PKI and the Army, 
President Sukarno still held the sway over the hearts and minds of the Indonesia people. Also 
in the period between January 1958 and 1959, the Indonesian government had embarked on 
an arms spending frenzy in both the Communist bloc and in the West that gave it growing 
capabilities that alarmed Australian policy-makers. In these circumstances, to continue to 
spar with the Indonesians over West New Guinea was seen as increasingly irrational.   
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Conclusion 
 
The Australian government’s response to the Indonesian Outer-Island Rebellion was a 
significant event in the history of the Australian government’s post-war foreign relations. The 
decisions of policy-makers ranging from Prime Minister Robert Menzies, External Affairs 
Minister Richard Casey, ambassadors, public servants, and military officers reflected the two 
overriding concerns of the Australian government’s foreign policy; firstly an overriding 
preoccupation with the idea that Communism would inevitably spread in Asia and secondly, 
fears that the decolonisation process in the region would cause political instability. 
Throughout the crisis, Australian government officials developed policies that would prevent 
Indonesia ‘going Communist’ and undermine Indonesian efforts to absorbed West New 
Guinea into the Republic.  
 
In 1949, Australia was lauded for its astute diplomacy that brought about the birth of the 
Indonesian Republic. Less than a decade later, Australian politicians were working with their 
colleagues in Washington and London to covertly undermine that very Indonesian 
Republican experiment. Why did this shift occur? In 1957-1958, Australian policy-makers 
encountered what they perceived to be a major threat emanating from Indonesia. The growing 
power of the Indonesian Communist Party, the growth of regional instability throughout the 
archipelago and its potential to undermine Dutch control of West New Guinea alarmed the 
Menzies government. 
  
Faced with this major foreign policy challenge in a country and a region so vital to Australian  
national security; the Australian government worked closely with the United States to 
destabilise the Sukarno regime and in turn implement regime change, or at least a bring about 
a shift in policy towards the PKI. This policy was endorsed by the highest levels of the 
Australian government, including Prime Minister Menzies and External Affairs Minister 
Casey. The policy of covert assistance to the rebels was a product of the Eisenhower 
Administration “New Look” foreign policy. Australian politicians too, however, readily saw 
Australian interests being served in putting the Central government in Jakarta under direct 
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pressure to modify its behaviour. Particularly, as the Menzies government recognised that the 
issue of West New Guinea had the potential to explode.  
 
In the end, for Australia, the United States, and the United Kingdom, providing of covert 
assistance to the rebels was shockingly naïve. It not only underestimated the political appeal 
of the rebels within Indonesia and their military capabilities, but it also failed to recognise the 
desire of Indonesians of all political stripes to resist foreign interference and preserve their 
territorial integrity. Supporting the rebellion merely facilitated an armed clash between two 
anti-communist groups; the army, and the regional rebels. The PKI, the main focus of 
Australian and American concerns, emerged even stronger as a result of the party firmly 
aligning itself with President Sukarno and those who wished to use force to end the revolt. 
When faced with this reality, Australian politicians and diplomats along with their American 
colleagues, pragmatically aligned their interests with the Indonesian army as the strongest 
force in Indonesian politics- besides the President- and the one most likely to resist the PKI. 
  
This shift in policy had a profound impact on the future of West New Guinea, a major 
concern for Australian foreign policy makers since the late 1940s. Western nations (including 
Australia) came to see the Indonesian Army as the only potential force capable of resisting 
further Communist gains either via the ballot box, through armed insurrection or with outside 
support. In these circumstances, the intransigence of Australia on Dutch retention of West 
New Guinea became a liability, particularly in terms of relations with the United States. The 
Eisenhower Administration humiliated after their failed initiative to support the regional 
rebels, moved rapidly to secure the friendship of senior military figures and seek 
reconciliation with President Sukarno. The cost of improved ties was American support for 
Indonesian gaining control of West New Guinea. 
 
In the cold reality of Cold War realpolitik, the global interests of the United States trumped 
Australian’s unique desire to see West New Guinea in friendly (i.e. Dutch) hands. This 
transfer would occur in 1962, with the Kennedy Administration playing an active role in 
facilitating the transfer of sovereignty under the auspice of the United Nations. The same 
Cold War priorities dictated President Kennedy’s decision as much as Eisenhower’s decision 
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to support, then abandon the rebels. The rights of Papuans to self-determination was ignored 
due to the Cold War priority of keeping Indonesia away from the Communist bloc.   
 
The response of the Australian government to the Outer-Island rebellion holds 
historiographical significance to our understanding of Australian foreign policy post-1945.  
The themes that have been brought together it this thesis, are themes at the heart of Australian 
diplomacy. The role of the United States in the region, fears for the future political direction 
of Indonesia and managing instability in those areas closest to the Australian mainland. The 
decisions of Australian policy-makers and officials during the rebellion and its aftermath had 
a profound impact on Australian foreign policy not only throughout the 1950s and 60s, but 
also to the present-day.
235
 The most significant impact of the Outer-Island rebellion was that 
it marked a shift in Australian strategic priorities from West New Guinea to Indonesia. 
 
 
Since 1949, West New Guinea had been at the core of Australia’s strategic interests in the 
region. However, as a result of the rebellion, Australian policy-makers cautiously backed 
away from previous commitments to Papuan self-determination under Dutch tutelage. As 
Indonesia became increasingly contested between the Cold War superpowers, particularly 
with the introduction of Soviet economic and military aid and the growing power of the PKI, 
Australian leaders came to realise that it was more strategically prudent to keep Indonesia 
anti-Communist. To keep Indonesia anti-communist meant developing ties with those 
political and military forces within Indonesia that opposed the PKI. However, in doing so, 
they had to concede the issue of WNG. Dutch control of the territory antagonised all 
Indonesians, both Communists and anti-Communists alike. In seeking to develop a greater 
relationship with moderate political elements in Jakarta and the Army in particular, a change 
in the Australian approach to West New Guinea was necessary.  
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The rebellion and its aftermath also had a profound impact on Australia’s relationship with 
the United States. Since the mid-1950s, Australian political leaders and diplomats saw a 
strong American diplomatic and military commitment to the region as vital to Australian 
national security. The shifting pattern of American policy towards Indonesia from supporting 
the rebels to seeking a rapprochement with Jakarta placed Australia in a difficult position, 
particularly concerning West New Guinea. Because of the reluctance and ambiguity on any 
American military commitment to assist the Dutch and the Australians in the event of an 
Indonesian attack on WNG, the Menzies government decided it would be unwise to offer any 
military assistance to the Dutch in the event of a crisis. Acting alone would present daunting 
diplomatic and military challenges, in particular, undermining the vital treaty commitments 
Australia had established in the region with the United States and leading to hostilities with 
Indonesia that could harm all aspects of the Australian-Indonesian relationship for 
generations. In making this decision, Australian leaders were deferring to the policy of 
forward defence as the best guarantee for Australia’s security in an unstable region.  
 
This thesis has sought to place the relatively obscure events of the Indonesian Outer-Island 
rebellion of 1958 in an Australian context. This thesis while being the first to provide an 
Australian perspective on the rebellion is not the final word on the topic. As more Australian, 
American, and British documents are declassified, further insights will be gained on the 
events of 1958. In addition, the lack of documentation on the Indonesian decision-making 
process hinders any scholarly attempt to include Indonesian voices. However, the work of 
such organisations as the “Cold War International History Project” at the Wilson Center in 
promoting the role of regional actors in the Cold War is cause to hope that this situation can 
be remedied. The purpose of this thesis was to see how Australia political, diplomatic, and 
military interests intersected with the Cold War in Asia and post-independence politics in 
Indonesia. The impact of the rebellion on Australian relations with Indonesia as well as with 
its allies, the United States and United Kingdom was an important aspect of the foreign 
policy of the Menzies government and significant in the impact it had on policy towards West 
New Guinea. It also reveals how the main foreign policy concerns of the Liberal-Country 
Party- Communist expansionism and decolonisation- affected Australia’s bilateral relations 
with Indonesia. 
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As Australian prosperity and security are further linked to the region in this “Asian Century”, 
the lessons of the Australian response to the Outer-Island rebellion are as important today as 
they were in the late 1950s. That Indonesian nationalism has a force and dynamism of its 
own, that the Indonesian’s view their territorial integrity as sacrosanct, and that the political 
trajectory of Indonesia has a direct impact on Australia. The future, as well as the past, bind  
Australia and Indonesia together. 
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